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“Below Investment Grade and Above the Law: A Past, Present and
Future Look at the Accountability of Credit Rating Agencies” by
Professor Marilyn Blumberg Cane, co-authored with Adam Shamir
and Tomas Jodar is a timely and comprehensive Article focusing on
the responsibility, and lack thereof, of credit rating agencies
(“CRAs”). The Article is titled “below investment grade” due to the
shoddy performance of the CRAs in light of their key role in the
financial crisis of 2007-08. It is also titled “above the law” because
of the CRAs’ lack of accountability due to regulatory sleight of hand
and the CRAs’ almost completely successful defense against liability
to bondholders through the invocation of the freedom of speech
under the First Amendment.
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This Article covers the evolution of the credit rating industry, in
particular, the noteworthy shift from the purchaser-subscriber to
issuer-pays model. It then describes the history of SEC CRA
regulatory measures, most notably the adoption of SEC Rule 436(g),
adopted in 1982, which specifically eliminated liability for the big
CRAs (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, Fitch’s and Duff and Phelps) as
1
“experts” under Sections 7 and 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.
This Article then covers the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of
2006 and the adoption of SEC Rule 17g-5, in so far as they
2
attempted to control conflicts of interest within CRAs. This Article
next turns to the freedom of speech as a defense effectively used by
CRAs, although the United States Supreme Court has yet to address
3
this issue directly. The thrust of the CRAs’ argument is that their
ratings are simply their expression of their opinion, akin to a review
4
of a restaurant or editorial column. There is much irony in this as
many regulated financial players, such as banks and insurance
companies, are required to comply with governmental rules that
mandate them to invest in “investment grade securities,” a “blessing”
conferred only by the privately owned CRAs.
Next, this Article dissects provisions regarding CRAs in the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
which among many other things, reads “Rule 436(g), promulgated
by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities
5
Act of 1933 shall have no force or effect.” As the reader will see,
this provision has not been enforced by the SEC, whereas in what
could only be seen as a game of hard ball, the CRAs won
notwithstanding the Act. For completeness, this Article then turns to
the European approach of CRA regulation, including the creation of
6
the European Securities and Markets Authority in January 2011.

1. Christopher Keller & Michael Stocker, Reining in the Credit Ratings Industry,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 2010, at 1.
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(a) (2010).
3. Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other
Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 85
(Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2006).
4. David Segal, A Matter of Opinion?, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2009, at BU1,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/business/19floyd.html?pagewanted=all.
5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 939G, 124 Stat. 1376, 1889 (2010).
6. Dorothee Fischer-Appelt, The European Securities and Markets Authority: The
Beginnings of a Powerful European Securities Authority?, LAW & FIN. MKTS. REV.,
Jan. 2011, at 21, available at http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload
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This Article concludes by suggesting, at a minimum, that CRAs be
subject to accountability, and that some formal, financially neutral
body conduct a periodic assessment rating the performance of the
CRAs.
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INTRODUCTION
“There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion.
There’s the United States and there’s Moody’s Bond Rating Service.
The United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody’s
can destroy you by downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it’s not
clear sometimes who’s more powerful,” said journalist Thomas
Friedman regarding the undeniable power of Credit Rating Agencies
(“CRAs”).7 In light of the August 5, 2011 downgrade of the United
States’ long-term federal debt by major credit rating agency Standard
and Poor’s, Mr. Friedman’s words ring truer than ever.8
CRAs have not always enjoyed such a commanding status, and
have evolved considerably to become the market-shaping giants they are
today.9 Millions of investors across the world rely on rating agencies to
help assess the creditworthiness of particular financial instruments.10
While these agencies perform a vital function for the financial
community, many individuals, investors, and organizations heavily
criticize the rating agencies, notably for their role in the 2007-2008 subprime mortgage crisis.11 CRAs have been blasted for their shoddy
performance in rating various structured financial instruments, raising
several questions regarding the accuracy of their ratings and the integrity
of the process as a whole.12
7. The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Interview with Thomas L. Friedman (PBS
television broadcast Feb. 13, 1996).
8. Binyamin Applebaum & Eric Dash, S.& P. Downgrades Debt Rating of U.S.
for the First Time, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2011, at A1.
9. Kevin Voigt, Explainer: The Power of Credit Rating Agencies, CNN (July 15,
2011, 1:53 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2011/BUSINESS/07/15/credit.ratings.agen
ncy.explain/index.html.
10. Timothy E. Lynch, Deeply and Persistently Conflicted: Credit Rating Agencies
in the Current Regulatory Environment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227, 242 (2009).
11. U.S. SEC, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION
STAFF’S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 1 (2008), http://www.se
c.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf [hereinafter SEC SUMMARY
REPORT].
12. Id. at 2.
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Moreover, certain rating agencies had long been exempt from
accountability as experts for the ratings that they issue.13 Under former
Rule 436(g) of the Securities Act of 1933, rating agencies labeled
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (“NRSROs”)
enjoyed an exemption from legal accountability as experts when their
ratings were used in connection with a registered offering.14 Many
people condemned this exemption for effectively shielding rating
agencies from accountability, while others considered the exemption to
be essential for the availability of quality ratings.15
Under Section 11(b)(3)(B) of the Securities Act of 1933, experts
(such as engineers, appraisers, or auditors) who have consented to be
named as having prepared or certified any part of a registration
statement have liability to persons acquiring securities in registered
offerings, unless the expert shall sustain the burden of proof that said
expert “had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to
believe, and did believe” that the expert’s statements were “true and that
there was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements not misleading.”16 In other
words, experts named in the registration statements have a statutory due
diligence defense.
Notwithstanding, the NRSROs were exempt from even this liability
under Rule 436(g).17 When Congress sought to remove the added
insulation from liability of Rule 436(g), the NRSROs played hardball.18
If they were to be held accountable for their ratings, upon which many
investors rely, indeed, upon which some institutions must rely as their
investments must be “investment grade”—a “blessing” conferred by the
NRSROs, by statute or regulation—they would take the ball and go

13.
14.
15.

Keller & Stocker, supra note 1, at 1.
Id.
Tracy Alloway, Why Repealing 436(g)Violates the First Amendment and Other
Rating Agency Guff, FINANCIAL TIMES (July 22, 2010, 1:45 PM), http://ftalphaville.
ft.com/blog/2010/07/22/294666/why-repealing-rule-436g-violates-the-first-amend
ment-and-other-rating-agency-guff/.
16. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B) (2010).
17. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,391.
18. See SEC Concept Release on Possible Rescission of Rule 436(g) Under the
Securities Act of 1933, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9071 (proposed Oct. 15, 2009),
available at available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2009/33-9071.pdf
[hereinafter SEC 2009 Concept Release].
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home.19 They would refuse to accept section 11 liability notwithstanding
what Congress decreed.20
Despite many half-hearted attempts to regulate CRAs by the SEC
over the years and most significantly, as discussed below, by Congress
in its enactment of Dodd-Frank,21 the SEC has been roundly criticized in
its dealings with the CRAs.22 In the New York Times “Fair Game”
column entitled “Hey, S.E.C., That Escape Hatch Is Still Open,”
Gretchen Morgenson wrote:
But since Dodd-Frank passed, Congress’s noble attempt to protect
investors from misconduct by ratings agencies has been thwarted by,
of all things, the Securities & Exchange Commission. The S.E.C.,
which calls itself “the investor’s advocate,” is quietly allowing the
raters to escape this accountability.
When Dodd-Frank became law last July, it required that ratings
agencies assigning grades to asset-backed securities be subject to
expert liability from that moment on. This opened the agencies to
lawsuits from investors, a policing mechanism that law firms and
accountants have contended with for years. The agencies responded
by refusing to allow their ratings to be disclosed in asset-backed
securities deals. As a result, the market for these instruments froze
on July 22.
The S.E.C. quickly issued a “no action” letter, indicating that it
would not bring enforcement actions against issuers that did not
disclose ratings in prospectuses. This removed the expert-liability

19. Id.; STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG.,
FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 102
(Comm. Print 2002) (hereinafter Watchdogs).
20. Anusha Shrivastava, Bond Sale? Don’t Quote Us, Request Credit Firms, WALL
ST. J. (July 21, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704723604575
379650414337676.html; Alain Sherter, As Obama Enacts Financial Reform, Credit
Rating Agencies Fight to Remain Above the Law, CBSNEWS (July 21, 2010),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-43546702/as-obama-enacts-financialreform-credit-rating-agencies-fight-to-remain-above-the-law/.
21. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
22. Robert Schmidt & Jesse Hamilton, SEC ‘Capacity Gap’ Risks Oversight
Lapses as Regulator’s Targets Multiply, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 7, 2011 12:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-07/sec-capacity-gap-risks-oversight-lapsesas-regulator-s-targets-multiply.html.
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threat for the ratings agencies, and the market began operating
23
again.

Recognizing rating agencies’ historical benefit of privilege without
the burden of responsibility, Morgenson further writes:
Unfortunately, the S.E.C.’s actions appear to continue the decades of
special treatment bestowed upon the credit raters. Among the
perquisites enjoyed by established credit raters is protection from
competition, since regulators were required to approve new entrants
to the business. Regulators have also sanctioned the agencies’ ratings
by embedding them into the investment process: financial
institutions post less capital against securities rated at or above a
certain level, for example, and investment managers at insurance
companies and mutual funds are allowed to buy only securities
receiving certain grades.
This is a recipe for disaster. Given that ratings were required and the
firms had limited competition, they had little incentive to assess
securities aggressively or properly. Their assessments of mortgage
securities were singularly off-base, causing hundreds of billions in
losses among investors who had relied on ratings.
That the S.E.C.’s move strengthens the ratings agencies’ protection
from investor lawsuits, which runs counter to the intention of DoddFrank, is also disturbing. Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s have
argued successfully for years that their grades are opinions and
subject to the same First Amendment protections that journalists
receive. This position has made lawsuits against the raters
exceedingly difficult to mount, a problem that Dodd-Frank was
24
supposed to fix.

Finally, Morgenson concludes that the SEC’s efforts have been
counterproductive to the legislative intent of Dodd-Frank:
I[t] is certainly important that the S.E.C. work to eliminate
references to ratings in the investment arena, and to reduce investor
reliance on them. But Congress couldn’t have been clearer in its
intent of holding the agencies accountable. That the S.E.C. is
25
undermining that goal is absurd in the extreme.

23. Gretchen Morgenson, Hey, S.E.C., That Escape Hatch is Still Open, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2011, at BU1.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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The Morgenson column was spurred by a letter written by
Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley to SEC Chairman
Mary Shapiro on March 1, 2011.26 That letter was in response to two no
action letters issued by the SEC’s Division of Corporate finance to Ford
Motor Credit in 2010.27 Attorney General Coakley’s letter states:
These [no action] letters state that the Division will not recommend
enforcement action if issuers of asset-backed securities (“ABS”) do
not comply with the ratings disclosure requirements of Regulation
AB, and thus fail to secure for investors the duty of competence
mandated by Section 11 of the Securities Act. Since last July, many
issuers have registered asset-backed securities without the required
ratings disclosure and consents by rating agencies to Section 11
liability.
As a matter of policy, we believe that creating a duty of competence
for rating agencies under Section 11 is a good thing. We believe that
Congress rescinded the rating agencies’ exemption from liability
with the expectation that this would result in rating agency liability.
While the Commission, in its prosecutorial discretion, may decide it
will not bring enforcement action in a given area, we are concerned
about the no-action letters for two reasons. First, we believe the
SEC’s decision to take no action in this area undermines recent
Congressional reform and is inconsistent with Congressional intent.
Second, the Commission’s no-action letters to Ford Motor Credit
have resulted in significant uncertainty for both governmental actors
and private parties. Legally, no-action letters are expressions of
enforcement policy. In practice, they are public statements by SEC
staff often taken to imply legal interpretations and administrative
action they do not contain. Yet the Commission’s exercise of
prosecutorial discretion does not affect whether SEC regulations and
the federal securities laws are being violated. We urge the
Commission to enforce Regulation AB in its entirety, in particular
with regard to the prospectus disclosure of ratings, as well as to
28
clarify the duties of issuers.

Attorney General Coakley concludes her letter by stating:

26. See Letter from Martha Coakley, Attorney General of Massachusetts, to Mary
Schapiro, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Mar. 1, 2011) [hereinafter
Coakley Letter], available at http://www.mass.gov/Cago/docs/press/2011_03_07
_sec_letter_attachment1.PDF.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1-2.
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We ask the Commission to enforce Regulation AB in its entirety and
in a manner consistent with the intent of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Although we are aware that the rating agencies declined to
participate in the securitization markets for the day of July 22, 2010,
we believe that the SEC should let the market set rating agency
pricing reflecting the Section 11 duty of competence. Calculating
29
risk of loss is the business of the rating agencies.

I. THE CREDIT RATINGS INDUSTRY
A credit rating agency is an organization that uses various models
to rate debt instruments and companies on a proprietary scale, typically
ranging from AAA premium ratings to junk bond ratings.30 CRAs “help
lenders pierce the fog of asymmetric information that surrounds lending
relationships. . . . [and] help borrowers (and their credit qualities)
emerge from that same fog.”31
The origin of CRAs lies in the desire of investors to be able to
evaluate the creditworthiness of a particular instrument without relying
on the biased representations made by its seller.32 Investors took
satisfaction in the independence of CRAs, which charged subscription
fees to the investing community in exchange for access to the valuable
ratings.33 John Moody, who founded Moody’s Investor Services, is
credited as a pioneer in the development of credit ratings in the early
twentieth century.34 Moody’s issued its first ratings in 1909.35
A. THE ISSUER-PAYS BUSINESS MODEL
Investors who sought advice on the likelihood of default of
corporate bonds flocked to Moody’s and other rating agencies, buying
subscriptions to access the valuable information.36 However, the
29.
30.

Id. at 10.
Caitlin M. Mulligan, From AAA to F: How the Credit Rating Agencies Failed
America and What Can be Done to Protect Investors, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1275, 1279
(2009).
31. Lawrence J. White, The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial Organization
Analysis 4 (Feb. 12, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.stern.nyu
.edu/eco/wkpapers/workingpapers01/01-02White.pdf.
32. Keller & Stocker, supra note 1.
33. Id.
34. Mulligan, supra note 30, at 1279.
35. White, supra note 31, at 8.
36. Mulligan, supra note 30, at 1279.
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evolution of capital markets made the subscriber-paid business model
less profitable, and rating agencies instead directed their services toward
the issuers of securities in an “issuer-pays” business model.37 As the
market evolved, investors began to demand that new issues of securities
retain at least one credit rating.38 Since issuers were increasingly
expected to issue rated securities, the rating agencies realized that their
service was better catered to the issuers than individual investors.39
Further, agencies faced difficulties in keeping their ratings away from
non-subscribers, so subscribers quickly became reluctant to continue
paying for ratings that increasingly became public information.40
Another factor that led to the issuer-pays model was that securities had
grown more complex, and agencies needed more resources than
subscription fees alone were generating.41
In the United States, the largest rating agencies are Standard and
Poor’s, Moody’s Investor Services, and Fitch.42 It is estimated that
Standard and Poor’s is responsible for issuing about half of all credit
ratings, and the “big three” combined issue approximately ninety-eight
percent of all ratings.43 Each major CRA in the United States derives
most of its revenue from contracts with securities issuers to rate their
securities.44 Issuers of securities typically provide rating agencies with
confidential or nonpublic information about their businesses and
securities.45 The agencies use this information to craft a creditworthiness
assessment, and then make their opinion publicly available.46
This “issuer-pays” business model creates an inherent conflict of
interest between CRAs and the issuers of the securities that CRAs are
being paid to rate.47 The major rating agencies generally downplay the
significance of this conflict, and claim that their reputations are far too
valuable for them to succumb to any inherent biases in their business

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Timothy E. Lynch, supra note 10, at 239.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mulligan, supra note 30, at 1279.
Id.
Lynch, supra note 10, at 234.
Id. at 237.
Id.
Id. at 235.
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model.48 Sometimes rating agencies disclose the methodologies they use
to calculate a credit rating, but they often provide only a basic rationale
of the credit analysis, leaving much of the justification for a rating to be
questioned.49
II. HISTORY OF SEC RATING AGENCY REFORM
A. EXPERT ACCOUNTABILITY
Two important laws that relate to the legal accountability of
experts, and potentially credit rating agencies, are Sections 7 and 11 of
the Securities Act of 1933.50 Section 7 requires the written consent of
any expert who has helped prepare or certify a registration statement.51
If any accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose
profession gives authority to a statement made by him, is named as
having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or
is named as having prepared or certified a report or valuation for use
in connection with the registration statement, the written consent of
52
such person shall be filed with the registration statement.

Section 11 of the Act details the liability of an expert who has made
untrue affirmations on a registration statement, and affords a cause of
action to those who are misled by false statements.53
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became
effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted
to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring
such security . . . may, either at law or in equity, in any court of
competent jurisdiction, sue . . . every accountant, engineer, or
appraiser, or any person whose profession gives authority to a
statement made by him, who has with his consent been named as
having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or
as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used
in connection with the registration statement, with respect to the

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 238.
See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77k (2010).
See id. § 77g(a).
Id.
See id. § 77k(a)(4).
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statement in such registration statement, report, or valuation, which
54
purports to have been prepared or certified by him . . . .

If CRAs are considered “experts” under Section 7, their written
consent would be required in order for a registration statement to
disclose their rating.55 Denoting the agencies as experts would also mean
that they could be sued for issuing a misleading rating that was disclosed
as part of a registration statement under Section 11.56 According to the
SEC, the purpose of Section 11 was to subject anyone with a direct role
in a registered offering to a more rigorous standard of liability, assuring
accurate disclosure regarding securities.57
The potential for liability has led credit rating agencies to label
their ratings as opinions rather than “expert” advice.58 They believe their
ratings are analogous to other published opinions, such as editorials or
restaurant reviews.59 As such, CRAs frequently utilize the “personhood”
of corporations in conjunction with the First Amendment protection of
freedom of speech as a defense against legal claims.60 Standard & Poor’s
is so serious about this defense that it hired the legendary Floyd Abrams,
a veteran in the freedom of speech arena.61 A major issue arises when
agencies regard their ratings as mere opinions, while at the same time
major market participants are continuously encouraged and sometimes
even obligated to utilize rating agencies.62 This creates an “unavoidable
reliance on the agencies and a financial market characterized by a
commingling of institutions.”63

54.
55.

Id.
Concept Release on Possible Rescission of Rule 436(g) Under the Securities
Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. pt. 220, 4-5 (proposed Oct. 15, 2009), available at
www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2009/33-9071.pdf [hereinafter SEC 2009 Concept Release].
56. Id. at 2-3.
57. Id. The SEC also notes that Section 11 afforded investors additional protection
from barriers to recovery under certain common law fraud requirements. Id.
58. Parisa Haghshenas, Note, Obstacles to Credit Rating Agencies First
Amendment Defense in Light of Abu Dhabi, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 452, 453 (2010).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Segal, supra note 4, at BU1.
62. Haghshenas, supra note 58, at 453.
63. Id.
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B. NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL
RATINGS ORGANIZATIONS
Ratings issued by CRAs are significant for two reasons: (1)
investors rely on them for an assessment of a product or company’s
creditworthiness, and (2) many entities are limited to purchasing
products rated “investment grade” by Nationally Recognized Statistical
Ratings Organizations.64 The origin of the “NRSRO” designation began
in 1975, but the history of the concept dates further back.65
Our financial system and capital markets have shown that major
interruptions in the flow of capital, such as institutional insolvencies,
create huge losses for investors holding a stake in those institutions.66
Since 1931, the United States “safety-and-soundness” regulation of
financial institutions has progressed with the goal of protecting investors
from losses arising from insolvencies, while also preserving the stability
of the banking system.67 With so much money riding on financial
institutions and the riskiness of the various assets they hold, regulators
sought to limit that risk by specifying which assets institutions like
banks could hold.68 This was done by either prohibiting institutions from
holding securities below a specified grade or by setting minimum capital
requirements for holding certain securities pursuant to their ratings.69
These requirements created a specific demand for creditworthiness
ratings.70 However, the question of whose ratings could be used for
regulatory purposes remained unanswered until 1975.71
In 1975, the SEC revised its Net Capital Rule by applying it to
broker-dealers in order to ensure that they had enough “liquid assets to
meet their obligations to their investors and creditors.”72 Broker-dealers
were required to maintain net capital over some calculated amount.73 A
broker-dealer calculating this minimum amount could deduct the
“percentages of the market value of their securities from their total net
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See Mulligan, supra note 30, at 1278-79.
See White, supra note 31, at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Net Capital Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1976).
Id.
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worth.”74 Under the 1975 revisions, banks could base their capital
requirements on the ratings of the securities they held, and certain
securities were subjected to lower margin requirements if at least two
NRSROs rated them as investment grade.75 In specifying rating
requirements, the SEC was next faced with the question of whose
ratings could be used, which it answered by creating the NRSRO
designation.76
Unfortunately, the SEC did not define or clarify the term “NRSRO”
at that time.77 The SEC also neglected to specify how a normal rating
agency could ascend to NRSRO status.78 Even without an “NRSRO”
definition, it was certainly understood that Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s,
and Fitch would fall under this select class of CRAs.79 Recognition by
the SEC as an NRSRO is important because most ratings-dependent
regulations make reference to only those select few agencies designated
by the SEC as NRSROs.80 In setting its margin requirements on the
basis of ratings issued by CRAs, the SEC cemented the rating agencies’
role in U.S. financial markets.81
C. EARLY REFORM OF RATING
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
In 1977, the SEC issued a concept release seeking comment on
whether it should allow, encourage, or require corporate debt security
ratings to be disclosed on registration statements and prospectuses.82
Traditionally, the SEC did not permit such disclosure in reports filed
with the Commission, but several factors led to consideration of whether
its stance should change.83 These factors include recommendations from
the staff, letters from the public, literature by security professionals, and

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Mulligan, supra note 30, at 1281.
Id.
White, supra note 31, at 24.
Mulligan, supra note 30, at 1281.
Id.
White, supra note 31, at 24 n.45.
Lynch, supra note 10, at 245.
Mulligan, supra note 30, at 1281.
Disclosure of Security Ratings, 42 Fed. Reg. 58,414, 58,414 (proposed Nov. 9,

1977).
83. Id.
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its own experience in administering securities laws.84 The SEC was
merely seeking comments on its proposal, and did not publish any new
guidelines in this release.85
The 1977 release acknowledged that security ratings are frequently
used in the investing community, and that reliance on ratings was
widespread in the securities markets.86 The SEC noted that ratings
already play a pivotal role in its Net Capital Rule, whereby certain
“haircut” deductions were permitted on short-term commercial paper
that is recognized as “investment grade” by at least two NRSROs.87 One
of the SEC’s inquiries in the 1977 release was whether “an entity issuing
a security rating [is] the type of person referred to in Section 7 of the
Securities Act of 1933 whose consent is required to be filed by the
issuer of the security.”88 It sought comment regarding the potential costs
or burdens associated with obtaining CRAs’ consent for the disclosure
of ratings.89 The SEC also inquired about the impact that could result
“from a rating entity being subject to Section 11 under the Securities Act
of 1933, with respect to its rating being disclosed in a prospectus[.]”90
Additionally, it sought comment on “additional disclosure concerning
the nature of a rating and the manner in which it is obtained,”
specifically when ratings are included in filed documents.91 Among the
additional disclosure proposals was one that would require disclosure of
“the fact that the agency was paid a fee for the rating,” offering an early
glimpse into the conflict of interest issue.92
The fifty-five comments in response to the 1977 release generally
opposed CRA consent requirements under Section 7 and liability as
experts under Section 11.93 It was argued that applying Section 7 and 11
to CRAs would slow down the timetable of the registration process and
would increase the cost of ratings due to the uncertain scope of CRA

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id. at 58,415.
Id. at 58,414.
Id. at 58,414 n.4. At this time, the term “investment grade” referred to a nonconvertible debt or preferred security that at least one NRSRO has rated within one of
its four highest rating categories.
88. Id. at 58,415.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 58,414.
93. See SEC 2009 Concept Release, supra note 55, at 7.
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liability.94 The NRSROs in existence in 1977 also declared that they
would decline to provide consent to be named in the registration
statement if it became a requirement.95
Four years later in 1981, the SEC formally announced its shift in
policy, permitting the voluntary disclosure of credit ratings in
registration statements.96 The 1981 release set forth two major
proposals. The first was to amend the Securities Act of 1933, to “permit
disclosure of security ratings of debt securities, convertible debt
securities or preferred stock assigned by a rating organization in certain
communications deemed not to be a prospectus.”97
The second proposal would have eliminated the required consent of
NRSROs under Section 7, and would have exempted an NRSRO from
civil liability as an expert under Section 11 when its rating was used as
part of a registration statement.98
[The second proposal] would add a new subparagraph (g) to Rule
436 under the Securities Act . . . to provide that a security rating is
not a part of a registration statement prepared or certified by a person
or a report or valuation prepared or certified by a person within the
99
meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of the Securities Act.

The SEC noted several factors leading to this proposal.100 First, if
NRSROs refused to provide consent then there would ultimately be zero
disclosure of credit ratings, even if permitted by the SEC.101 As a result,
436(g) was proposed by the SEC “in order to make its new policy
position on disclosure of credit ratings meaningful.”102 Next, responses
to the 1977 release stated that procuring acquiring agencies’ consent
under Section 7 would prove to be troublesome and time-consuming.103
A rating organization would not likely consent, until it could fully
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 8.
Disclosure of Security Ratings in Registration Statements, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,024,
42,024 (proposed Aug. 18. 1981).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 42,024-25.
99. Id. at 42,024.
100. Id. at 42,027.
101. SEC 2009 Concept Release, supra note 55, at 8.
102. Id. at 8-9.
103. Disclosure of Security Ratings in Registration Statements, 46 Fed. Reg.
42,024, 42,027 (proposed Aug. 18, 1981).
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ensure that its rating was based on all of the information in the
registration statement if at all.104 If Section 7 written consent became a
requirement, NRSROs would have increased involvement with the
content and timing of a registration statement, which “would inject the
rating organization into the registration process as a participant, not as
an objective evaluator, thus lessening its independence from the
issuer.”105 Another reason for proposing 436(g) was that the prospect of
liability under Section 11 would lead rating agencies to issue ratings
solely on the basis of quantifiable data rather than informal subjective
factors, lessening the quality of ratings.106 This change would be
damaging to the ratings process.107 The uncertain scope of Section 11
liability would also lead NRSROs to raise their fees, which would be
detrimental to newer or smaller issuers of securities facing higher
costs.108 The SEC believed it could circumvent these issues by
permitting disclosure of ratings in registration statements without
requiring agencies’ consent, which would give investors direct access to
the ratings.109 The proposed exemptions would only apply to rating
agencies who were NRSROs under the Net Capital Rule.110
The SEC justified the proposed exemptions by noting that rating
organizations could already be subject to liability under select anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws, and thus 436(g) would serve to
further hold NRSROs to the highest professional standards.111
Additionally, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 gave the SEC some
jurisdiction over rating agencies.112 Section 206 of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 authorizes the SEC to “define and prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of

104.
105.

Id.
See also id. at 42,028. “As previously discussed, the Commission is taking this
action, in part, because it is concerned about the practical problems that were raised by
the commentators, particularly the possible interference with the rating process and the
possible difficulty in obtaining rating organization consents.” Id.
106. Id. at 42,027.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 42,028.
111. Id.
112. Id. At the time of the proposal for Rule 436(g), NRSROs were generally
required to register as investment advisers. The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of
2006 provides an exclusion from the Advisers Act for NRSROs.
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business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.”113 Therefore, if
improper issuance of security ratings would become a problem, the SEC
believed that Section 206 would give it authority to regulate such
behavior.114
D. THE ADOPTION OF RULE 436(G) AND BEYOND
In 1982, the SEC formally adopted several important proposals.115
A majority of responses to the 1977 and 1981 proposals were in favor of
permitting voluntary disclosure of credit ratings and an exemption for
NRSROs from Sections 7 and 11 of the Securities Act.116 The 1982
release affirmed the adoption of the Rule 436(g) exemption for
NRSROs.117
The Commission continues to believe that ratings should be
permitted to be disclosed in Commission filings . . . and that it is
appropriate to exempt NRSROs from Section 11 liability if their
ratings are included in Securities Act registration statements.
Accordingly, the Commission today is affirming its new policy and
118
adopting the proposed amendments to Rules 436 and 134.

At that time, the organizations recognized as NRSROs under the
Net Capital Rule were Standard & Poor’s Corporation, Moody’s
Investor Services, Inc., Fitch Investors Services, and Duff and Phelps,
Inc.119
Non-NRSROs were not afforded the privilege of exemption, and
any disclosure of their ratings in a registration statement would require
their written consent and could potentially expose them to civil liability
as experts.120 The Commission acknowledged that several commentators

113. Disclosure of Security Ratings in Registration Statements, 46 Fed. Reg. at
42,028.
114. Id.
115. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,380
(proposed Mar. 16, 1982).
116. See id. at 11,391.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 11,392 n.54.
120. SEC 2009 Concept Release, supra note 55, at 10 (“While an NRSRO would
not be required to provide a consent if its rating was disclosed in a registration
statement pursuant to Rule 436(g), ‘[a]ny non-NRSRO non-NRSRO rating organization

2012]

BELOW THE INVESTMENT GRADE
AND ABOVE THE LAW

1081

criticized the Net Capital Rule for lacking any specific definition of the
NRSRO term and also for its lack of guidance on how to qualify as an
NRSRO.121 The SEC responded by declaring that it was “not aware of
any substantial burden being imposed on rating organizations that are
not NRSROs due to any absence of guidance in this area.”122
The 1982 release clarified that the voluntary disclosure of security
ratings was not limited to only Securities Act registration statements, but
also applied to certain Exchange Act of 1934 filings.123 Security ratings
could also be included in tombstone advertisements.124
The SEC then published some considerations for disclosing a
security rating in a registration statement.125 The registrant should first
consider disclosing every other publicly available ranking assigned by
an NRSRO that substantially differs from the disclosed rating.126 A
registrant should also consider providing additional information
regarding the characteristics of security ratings, making clear the source
of the rating so that investors can obtain more information.127 When a
rating is included in a registration statement, but the rating changes prior
to the effectiveness of the statement, a registrant should consider
amending it to disclose the rating change.128 The SEC opted to include
only a list of things that a registrant “should consider,” rather than
establishing concrete disclosure requirements.129
In 1986, the SEC proposed to extend the exemptions of 436(g) to
include NRSRO ratings of money market funds.130 The policies of the
1982 release did extend to preferred stock equity securities, but not other
types of equity securities such as money market fund shares.131
Therefore, it was proposed that exempting money market fund ratings
from Section 7 and 11 of the Securities Act was a “logical extension” of
must furnish a consent and take on expert liability under the Securities Act if its rating
is included in the registration statement and prospectus.’”).
121. Id. at 11,392 n.54.
122. Id. at 11,392.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Disclosure of Security Ratings by Money Market Funds, 51 Fed. Reg. 9,838,
9,838 (proposed Mar. 21, 1986).
131. Id.
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its action in adopting Rule 436(g).132 The proposal would permit a
money market fund with an NRSRO rating to disclose that rating
without obtaining the NRSRO’s consent before using it in a registration
statement.133 The 1986 proposal was never put into action, and Rule
436(g) was not amended to include money market fund ratings.134
In 1994, the SEC published a proposal that would mandate the
disclosure of security ratings in cases where a rating is obtained by or on
behalf of an issuer.135 An issuer would also be required to discuss the
scope of the rating and disclose any subsequent material changes to the
security rating.136 The SEC’s 1994 proposal was intended to “improve
the quality and timeliness of security ratings disclosures . . . in
prospectuses and periodic reports, and to reduce the potential for market
misunderstanding and confusion over the scope and meaning of security
ratings.”137 The SEC felt compelled to propose mandatory disclosure
requirements because the scope and meaning of security ratings had
become more variable while disclosure requirements had remained the
same.138 Until 1994, the SEC had not seen a “pressing need” for
mandatory disclosure, but proposed it at that time because the securities
market had evolved to include many more types of securities, such as
complex mortgage and asset-backed securities and other structured
financial instruments.139 Notwithstanding these market developments,
the SEC had enacted few changes to its ratings disclosure policies.140
The 1994 release also solicited comments on whether the SEC
should continue to distinguish between NRSROs and Non-NRSROs for
the purpose of Rule 436(g) exemptions.141 It also inquired as to whether
Rule 436(g) should extend to Non-NRSROs, and whether the exemption
for NRSROs should be rescinded completely.142 The SEC wanted to
discourage “rating shopping,” whereby a company could avoid
132.
133.
134.
135.

1994).
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 9,839.
Id.
SEC 2009 Concept Release, supra note 55, at 9.
Disclosure of Security Ratings, 59 Fed. Reg. 46,304, 46,304 (proposed Sept. 7,
Id.
Id.
Id. at 46,305.
Id.
Id. at 46,306.
Id. at 46,308.
Id.
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disclosure of negative unsolicited ratings while only disclosing
favorable solicited ratings.143 The Commission also sought comments
regarding the scope of information that should be disclosed alongside a
security rating, and offered several of its own proposals to help remedy
any potential investor confusion.144
Comments in response to the 1994 proposal generally opposed the
exposure of NRSROs and CRAs to Section 11 liability under the
Securities Act.145 Among the commentators were Moody’s and Fitch
Investors Service, who defended security ratings as mere “expressions
of opinion about risk,” alleging that Section 11 liability would violate
the First Amendment rights of NRSROs.146 They added that the potential
for liability could reduce or even eliminate the disclosure of security
ratings.147 The SEC ultimately did not act on its 1994 proposals.148
In 2002, months after the corporate giant Enron declared
bankruptcy, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs held
various hearings regarding the corporation’s finances.149 It subsequently
produced a detailed report, urging “increased oversight for these rating
agencies in order to ensure that the public’s trust in these firms is wellplaced.”150 Since the term “NRSRO” appeared in 1975, the Committee
found that no less than eight federal statutes, forty-seven federal
regulations, and over one hundred state laws and regulations made
benchmark references to NRSROs.151 While they were generally related
to banking and securities, other regulations making reference to
NRSROs dealt with education, transportation and even
telecommunications.152
A 2005 SEC proposal sought to define the term NRSRO in order to
recognize certain agencies that the SEC could rely on in formulating its
regulations.153 However, due to concerns from Congress that the

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 46,309.
Id. at 46,310-11.
SEC 2009 Concept Release, supra note 55, at 10.
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Watchdogs, supra note 19, at 1.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 102.
Id.
Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 70 Fed.
Reg. 21,306, 21,310 (proposed Apr. 25, 2005); Mulligan, supra note 30, at 1285.
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Commission lacked the specific authority to oversee the credit rating
industry in this manner, the 2005 proposal was never adopted.154
Proposals were also made in 2008 to amend Rule 436(g),155 and in
2009 to rescind 436(g),156 discussed in the sections below.
1. The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006
In the wake of the economic collapse of numerous large and wellrated companies, Congress enacted The Credit Rating Agency Reform
Act of 2006.157 The preamble to the Act expresses its goal, “[t]o improve
ratings quality for the protection of investors and in the public interest
by fostering accountability, transparency, and competition in the credit
rating agency industry.”158
The Act finally offered credit rating agencies the ability to ascend
to NRSRO status by registering with the SEC and providing certain
information.159 The required information includes statistics regarding
short and long-term performance, procedures used to determine credit
ratings, policies implemented by the applicant to prevent the misuse of
nonpublic information, and whether the applicant has procedures in
place for addressing conflicts of interest.160 To qualify, a CRA must be
in business for at least three years preceding its application.161 The Act
gives the SEC “exclusive authority to enforce the provisions” regarding
NRSROs,162 and allows it to amend or review the regulations in
furtherance of the objectives of the Act.163
The ability to register with the SEC would allow more agencies to
earn the NRSRO designation, consequently fostering increased
competition in the ratings industry.164 Disclosure requirements were set
154.
155.
156.
157.

Mulligan, supra note 30, at 1286.
Security Ratings, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,106, 40,114 (proposed July 11, 2008).
SEC 2009 Concept Release, supra note 55, at 3.
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat.
1327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Lynch, supra note 10, at
267-68.
158. Id.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006).
160. Id.. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B).
161. Id. § 78o-7(a)(1)(C)(iv)(II).
162. Id. § 78o-7(c).
163. Id. § 78o-7(n)(1).
164. Paul Lasell Bonewitz, Implications of Reputation Economics on Regulatory
Reform of the Credit Rating Industry, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 391, 420 (2010).
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in order to increase transparency, which “allows investors to develop
informed opinions and facilitates accountability.”165
The Act also sets forth several provisions regarding the conflict of
interest issue.166 NRSROs were required to enact policies for eliminating
potential conflicts of interest:
Each nationally recognized statistical rating organization shall
establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures
reasonably designed, taking into consideration the nature of the
business of such nationally recognized statistical rating organization
and affiliated persons and affiliated companies thereof, to address
and manage any conflicts of interest that can arise from such
167
business.

The SEC was given the authority to issue the final rules regarding
the management and disclosure of conflicts of interest.168 Types of
conflicts that the SEC could regulate include the manner in which an
NRSRO is paid by the issuer for ratings, NRSROs’ providing advisory
and consulting services to issuers, and close business and financial
relationships with issuers or their affiliates.169 It is worth noting that
under the Act, NRSROs must only abide by their own set of procedures
and methodologies that they develop, and the SEC is prohibited from
regulating the actual procedures or methodologies of any agency.170
A final provision in the Act calls for a study to be conducted in
order to identify how the Act impacts the quality of credit ratings,
financial markets, competition among rating agencies, the NRSRO

165. Id. The author makes several noteworthy assertions about the scope of the
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, and the potential for achieving its
objectives:
[C]ompetition, accountability, and transparency will lead to accuracy only if NRSROs
are more concerned with preserving their reputation for accuracy than they are with
serving issuers’ regulatory need for investment grade ratings. If, on the other hand, the
regulatory value of ratings dominates their informational value or the reputation
mechanism otherwise fails, the Act will do little to promote rating accuracy. . . .
Competition among NRSROs will promote accuracy only to the extent that their
clients, the issuers, demand accuracy.

Id. at 422.
166. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h).
167. Id. § 78o-7(h)(1).
168. Id. § 78o-7(h)(2).
169. Id.
170. Bonewitz, supra note 164, at 421.
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registration process, and conflicts of interest by NRSROs.171 This
provision delegated the study to the Comptroller General of the United
States, and requires the report to be submitted within three to four years
of the enactment of the Act.172
2. Proposals in 2008 and 2009
In 2008, the SEC simultaneously published three releases
proposing changes to security ratings and NRSROs.173 The proposals
were set forth in furtherance of the Act.174
In its June 16 release, the SEC proposed two initiatives targeted at
reducing conflicts of interest, increasing competition among rating
agencies, and improving investors’ understanding of the risks associated
with structured finance products.175 The rulemaking initiatives addressed
“concerns about the integrity of the credit rating procedures . . . of
NRSROs in light of the role they played in determining the security
ratings for securities that were the subject of the recent turmoil in the
credit markets.”176
In its July 11 release, the SEC contemplated whether its inclusion
of security rating requirements in many of its forms and rules had
effectively affixed an “official seal of approval” on the use of security
ratings.177 It believed that this sort of approval was undermining the
quality of investors’ own analysis and due diligence, consequently
leading to undue reliance on security ratings issued by NRSROs.178 Prior
to this proposal, eligible issuers could only use Short Forms S-3 and F-3
for asset-backed securities if they met certain rating requirements,
specifically if the securities were rated “investment grade” by
NRSROs.179 In an attempt to reduce reliance on credit ratings, the SEC
proposed new requirements for Short Form S-3 and F-3, which were
based on a minimum denomination amount rather than security
171. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, § 7, 120 Stat.
1327, 1338 (2006).
172. Id. § 7, 120 Stat. at 1339.
173. Security Ratings, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,106, 40,106 (proposed July 11, 2008).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 40,106-07.
176. Id. at 40,107.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 40,111.
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ratings.180 Under the proposal, an issuer utilizing Short Forms S-3 and F3 to register primary offerings of non-convertible securities for cash
could only do so if it has issued over $1 billion in non-convertible
securities for cash, as of sixty days prior to filing the registration
statement.181 The SEC also sought comment on whether there exists an
alternative definition of “investment grade debt securities” that did not
incorporate NRSRO ratings and would still adequately relate short-form
registration to the recognition of a widespread marketplace following.182
The SEC ultimately did not act on its 2008 proposals.183
As the significance of credit ratings increased, the SEC sought to
provide more protection to investors by contemplating the rescission of
Rule 436(g) in 2009.184 It was concerned that its original bases for
distinguishing between NRSROs and Non-NRSROs with regard to
Section 11 liability were no longer sufficient.185
[W]e are now exploring whether Rule 436(g) is still appropriate in
light of the growth and development of the credit rating industry and
investors’ use of credit ratings. We are mindful of the potential
significant impact that rescinding Rule 436(g) could have on
registrants, NRSROs and other credit rating agencies, investors and

180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 40,112.
183. SEC 2009 Concept Release, supra note 55, at 12.
184. Id. at 4.
185. Id. at 3.
Section 11 of the Securities Act imposes liability on various parties who are involved
in the preparation of registration statements filed under the Securities Act. Section 11
was enacted so that those persons with a direct role in a registered offering would be
subject to a rigorous standard of liability to assure that disclosure regarding securities
is accurate. . . . Section 11 provides that an expert may be held liable if, when the
registration statement became effective, the part of the registration statement
purporting to be made on his or her authority contained an untrue statement of
material fact or omitted to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading, unless he can establish that he had, after reasonable
investigation, reasonable grounds to believe and did believe at the time such part of
the registration statement became effective, that the statements in the registration
statement were true . . . Under Section 11, persons other than the issuer may be able to
assert as a defense to Section 11 liability that they relied upon an expert that
consented to be named in the registration statement (the “experts’ defense”).

Id. at 5.
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the financial markets in general, and we seek comment on any
burdens or benefits that may result.186

The SEC’s scrutiny of Rule 436(g) was based on four primary
factors.187 First, it believed that the underlying rationale behind Rule
436(g) was no longer sufficient to continue to allow NRSROs to be
exempt from Section 11 in light of its recent mandatory disclosure
requirements.188 When the SEC first permitted voluntary disclosure of
security ratings in registration statements in the 1980s, it believed that
eliminating the Section 7 consent and Section 11 liability requirements
for NRSROs would effectively promote the use of security ratings,
thereby making its policy more meaningful.189 If the SEC were to adopt
its 2008 proposals mandating the disclosure of security ratings, it would
“no longer need to provide a means to encourage disclosure about credit
ratings,” making the rationale of 436(g) inapplicable.190 Another
underlying reason for enacting 436(g) was that CRAs were already
subject to liability under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, which the
SEC believed would provide sufficient investor protection against faulty
security ratings.191 Since the Act provides an exemption for NRSROs
from the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, this protection also no longer
applies.192
The second reason for proposing the rescission of 436(g) was the
contention that investors rely on credit rating agencies as experts when
their ratings are used to sell securities, and as such it could be
appropriate to apply the SEC’s liability scheme for experts onto
NRSROs.193 “In our view, NRSROs represent themselves to registrants
and investors as experts at analyzing credit and risk,” thus the SEC felt
that rating agencies should be treated as experts.194 Although NRSROs
generally believe that their ratings are mere “opinions” on risk, the SEC
notes that investors also rely on the opinions of other professionals, and
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 15; Disclosure of Security Ratings in Registration Statements, 46 Fed.
Reg. 42,024, 42,028 (proposed Aug 18, 1981).
193. SEC 2009 Concept Release, supra note 55, at 15.
194. Id.
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those opinions are still subject to Section 7 and 11 of the Securities
Act.195 If NRSROs and CRAs are issuing expert opinions, the SEC saw
no reason why they should not be treated as experts under the Securities
Act.196
The third reason given for potentially repealing 436(g) was that
exposure to the risk of liability under Section 11 would foster an
improvement in the quality of credit ratings and enhance NRSROs’
accountability.197 Eliminating the protective shield of Rule 436(g) would
encourage NRSROs and CRAs to improve the quality of their ratings in
order to reduce their potential liability.198
The Commission’s final reason was that the distinction between
NRSROs and Non-NRSROs could create “competitive disadvantages”
and lead to high barriers of entry into the credit ratings industry.199 NonNRSROs would likely face higher costs than NRSROs because of their
potential risk for liability.200 The Commission notes that despite
NRSROs’ past unwillingness to be subject to liability, the core of the
CRA business model remains to be the issuance of credit ratings.201 Due
to their importance to NRSRO revenues, it is unlikely that agencies
would cease to issue credit ratings in the face of potential liability.202
III. THE CONTROVERSIAL ROLE OF RATING
AGENCIES IN GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS
As self-established authorities on creditworthiness, both the
accurate and inaccurate opinions of credit rating agencies may be
thought of too highly by investors, notably when dealing with complex
structured financial products.203 After the United States economic
195. Id. at 15-16. Examples of other professional opinions that investors rely on
include legal opinions, valuation opinions, fairness opinions, and audit reports.
196. Id. at 16.
197. Id. at 16.
198. SEC 2009 Concept Release, supra note 55, at 16. The Commission
acknowledged that the potential for liability could undermine competition in the credit
ratings industry because certain agencies may exit the industry to avoid liability, and
because new entrants in the ratings market may reconsider their choice in light of
Section 11 liability.
199. Id. at 17.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 19.
202. See id.
203. See Lynch, supra note 10, at 234, 284-85.
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collapse of 2007-2008, the excessive packaging and sale of sub-prime
mortgages was largely to blame.204 This occurrence and its subsequent
economic impact left many questions to be answered, including why so
many investors chose to invest in our housing market during a housing
bubble.205 While some of the blame for the sub-prime mortgage crisis
lies with uninformed homeowners and unethical loan originators who
gave out mortgages to those who lacked the creditworthiness to make
timely payments, the major CRAs in America also played a large role in
the crisis.206 The heavy investment in structured financial instruments
such as mortgage-backed securities can be traced back, in part, to the
improper ratings given to those securities by Moody’s, Standard and
Poor’s, and Fitch Ratings.207 “Investor appetites” for mortgage-backed
securities and other collateralized debt obligations were fueled by
NRSROs, whose inflated ratings characterized certain investments as
less risky than they really were.208 As investor reliance on credit ratings
increased, the level of due diligence and individual analysis of credit
risks decreased, and credit ratings soon became substitutes—rather than
supplements—for internal creditworthiness analysis.209
Performance of top-rated structured securities steadily decreased,
prompting ratings downgrades for the complex financial instruments.210
Unfortunately for investors, it was too late. The delayed timing of the
rating agencies in downgrading certain ratings raised several questions
about the overall accuracy and integrity of the credit rating process.211
The sub-prime mortgage crisis revealed only a glimpse of the powerful
and influential role of rating agencies in government and business.212
Further cementing the hegemonic role of CRAs in the global
economy is the value of the services they provide to both investors and
securities issuers.213 For example, investors with limited access to
research and analytical tools rely heavily on CRAs for making credit

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See id. at 231, 258.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 233-34.
Id. at 234.
Lynch, supra note 10, at 234.
Id.
SEC SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 11, at 2.
Id.
Lynch, supra note 10, at 236.
Id. at 240-41.
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evaluations in an efficient manner.214 When investors need not use their
own energy, time, and money to research every investment opportunity,
efficiency increases and overall costs of investing decreases.215
Additionally, CRAs are given access to nonpublic information
unavailable to most investors, contributing to their value in the
investment community.216 An issuer of securities that have been rated by
a major CRA also benefits through lower costs of capital.217 An investor
considering a purchase of debt securities would be more inclined to do
so if the securities were rated, because the investor would not be
burdened with having to fully evaluate their creditworthiness.218 This
becomes particularly true when the securities involved are of a complex
nature, such as mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt
obligations.219
A. CONFLICT OF INTEREST ISSUE
The continuing chain of financial scandals as of late has brought
significant attention to conflicts of interest between credit rating
agencies and securities issuers.220 The process of issuers paying agencies
for their own ratings creates an inherent conflict of interest.221 This
conflict is aggravated by the fact that CRAs typically offer consulting
services to issuers on how to maintain or improve their ratings.222
Despite the inherent flaws in the issuer-pays model, CRAs claim that
they manage their conflicts of interest through internal processes.223
On its face, the close-contact relationship between rating agencies
and issuers allows the agencies to make the most accurate judgments in
calculating ratings while also ensuring that the issuer client is

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 241.
Id.
Id. at 242.
Daniel M. Covitz & Paul Harrison, Testing Conflicts of Interest at Bond
Ratings Agencies with Market Anticipation: Evidence that Reputation Incentives
Dominate 2 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Paper No. 2003-68, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/a
bstract=512402.
221. Id. at 6.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 2.
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satisfied.224 “But, as with a hostage that eventually sympathizes with his
or her captors, with close contact comes the potential for an issuer to
cloud the judgment of a CRA.”225 The ability of issuers to persuade
CRAs to give them favorable ratings—or delay ratings downgrades—
will be strong as long as issuers continue to pay for their own ratings.226
The potential for conflicts of interest is exacerbated by the
complexity of structured financial products such as collateralized debt
obligations and residential mortgage-backed securities.227 In the process
of rating a traditional financial instrument, an issuer of securities has
little room to improve its creditworthiness and risk characteristics prior
to being rated.228 However, in the arena of structured finance, rating
agencies play an active role in shaping the architecture of structured
products.229 “In practice, [issuers] will routinely use [CRAs’] publicly
available models to pre-structure deals and subsequently engage in a
process that is ‘iterative and interactive,’ informing the issuer of the
requirements to attain desired ratings in different tranches and largely
defining the requirements of the structures to achieve target ratings.”230
Typically, an issuer will propose certain structures of seniority within
each tranche with the objective of achieving a favorable credit rating.231
The development of models for rating collateralized debt obligations
allowed issuers to reconfigure assets that were previously rated below
investment grade into tranches offering higher yields at less of a credit
risk.232 The rating agency, now playing an advisory role, indicates to the
issuer whether the assets and structures will attain favorable ratings
224. Milosz Gudzowski, Comment, Mortgage Credit Ratings and the Financial
Crisis: The Need for a State-Run Mortgage Security Credit Rating Agency, 2010
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 245, 257 (2010).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Joseph Mason & Joshua Rosner, Where did the Risk Go? How Misapplied
Bond Ratings Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized Debt Obligation
Market Disruptions 13 (May 14, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
www.riskandinsurance.com/userpdfs/MasonRosner2.pdf.
228. Id. at 13.
229. Id.
230. Id. (quoting Taiwan Ratings, http://www.taiwanratings.com/en/criteria/SF
_ratingprocess.asp (last visited Nov. 4, 2010)).
231. Letter from John R. Rutherford, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n (Mar. 8, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-04-07/s7040717.pdf.
232. Mason & Rosner, supra note 227, at 17.
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pursuant to the agency’s methodologies.233 This immerses rating
agencies into the structuring process of a deal, leaving an open door for
conflicts of interest.234
Given the complexity of these financial instruments, the CRAs’
role in assessing the creditworthiness at each level is essential to the sale
and distribution of the financial instruments.235 A favorable rating seems
to dictate how marketable a given structure will be to investors, further
increasing market reliance on credit ratings.236 Therefore, it could be
said that an agency’s rating is “essential” to the issuer’s ability to sell its
assets.237 With the balance of power in favor of CRAs, which are in a
position to influence an issuer’s overall ability to sell securities, the need
for objective ratings becomes even more apparent.238
Conflicts of interest can occur throughout the ratings process from
beginning to end.239 For example, below are a few “pressure points” in
the process that are susceptible to such conflicts:
At the initial contact between the issuer and/or its investment bank in
soliciting a rating. In the application by the issuer of the agency’s
rating model and assessment of an issue’s rating-sensitivity to
changes in the structure of the offering and discussions with agency
staff.
During meetings between the agency’s staff and corporate
management of government officials and the assembly of both
public and private information.

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Mason & Rosner, supra note 227, at 14. Mason & Rosner question whether the
characteristic of being in control of a security’s marketability is sufficient to categorize
credit rating agencies as underwriters:
According to the 1933 Securities Act the term “underwriter” includes “any
person who . . . has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or
participates or has a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any
such undertaking . . . .” It seems plausible there may be a basis for argument that
they have participated in the underwriting.
Id. (quoting Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11) (2006)).
238. See id.
239. ROY C. SMITH & INGO WALTER, RATING AGENCIES: IS THERE AN AGENCY
ISSUE?, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 289, 309
(Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002).
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During the preparation of a recommendation to the rating committee,
and during the committee meeting leading to the rating to be
assigned.
During the comment period made available to the issuer between the
preliminary assignment of a rating and its publication. Following
rating reviews which place an issuer on a “watch list” for possible
re-rating—usually negative, stable or positive—after there has been
an unexpected material change in the issuer’s fundamentals and
240
announcement that a rating review is in process.

In the ordinary course of business, other key sources of conflicts of
interest at the individual level include: ownership of securities by CRA
analysts who participate in the ratings process for those securities;
serving as directors, officers, or employees at entities they rate;
maintaining business relations that are beyond the scope of ordinary
business; receiving gifts from issuers who are subject to a CRA’s rating;
and CRA compensation contingent on revenues generated from debt
issuers subject to a CRA’s rating.241 At the credit rating agency level,
conflict of interest sources include: CRA affiliation with the issuer or
underwriter of securities; rendering ancillary services to rated entities;
and issuer payments to CRAs for providing ratings under an issuer-paid
business model.242
1. Conflicts of Interest and Reputation
How is the reputation of the major rating agencies affected by
conflicts of interest? NRSROs have consistently cited the importance of
their business reputation as a key incentive for avoiding conflicts of
interest.243 Disciplinary action against a rating agency by the SEC could
severely impair the ability of the agency to attain future business and
revenue.244 If a CRA is deemed to have violated legal or professional
standards, serious doubt would be cast on the credibility of its past and
future ratings.245 Further, in a global economy where the name of a
rating agency signifies the quality of its ratings, violations of conflicts of
240.
241.

Id.
Lynn Bai, On Regulating Conflicts of Interest in the Credit Rating Industry, 15
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 253, 272 (2010).
242. Id. at 277.
243. Id. at 310.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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interest “destroy the perceived value of having a rating from the agency
that granted it.”246 Moody’s has stated that its success is contingent upon
maintaining its professional reputation and coveted brand name.247
Another reputation-related factor is that misleading ratings would entice
securities issuers to seek ratings from competitors.248 Investors would
discount the value of credit ratings issued by any CRA with a reputation
for bias and seek out more CRAs.249
Notwithstanding the discussion above, the high barriers to entry in
the credit ratings industry and the “two-rating norm” in many markets
diminish the significance of reputation as an incentive against conflicts
of interest because there is not as much competition between the
firms.250 The two-rating norm describes the typical practice of obtaining
ratings from two different agencies for each issue.251 Since this entails
that the first two rating agencies need not compete against one another,
the CRA market has been said to be a “partner monopoly” consisting of
Moody’s and S&P.252 The Credit Rating Reform Act of 2006 attempted
to reduce the barriers of entry by announcing procedures for achieving
NRSRO status.253 NRSRO designation can be seen as a barrier, given
that only NRSRO-issued ratings carry official weight with the SEC.254
246.
247.
248.
249.

SMITH & WALTER, supra note 239, at 310.
Id. at 311.
Id.
Stephane Rousseau, Enhancing the Accountability of Credit Rating Agencies:
The Case for a Disclosure-Based Approach, 51 MCGILL L.J. 617, 637-38 (2006).
250. See John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit
Crisis”: The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for
Improvement, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109, 131-33 (2009).
251. See id. at 132.
252. Id.; see also Letter from Sean J. Egan & W. Bruce Jones, Egan-Jones Ratings
Co. to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Nov. 10, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/credrate/eganjones2.htm.
The phrase “partner monopoly” is explained in terms of the noncompetitive
relationship between Moody’s and S&P. In the case of most US corporate ratings and
an increasing number of structured finance transactions, S&P and Moody’s are the only
firms used. The industry could more accurately be described as a “partner monopoly,” a
term used by U.S. Department of Justice personnel. A partner monopoly differs from an
oligopoly in the sense that the two firms share the market whereby the gain in revenues
by one firm does not reduce the revenues of the second firm. Since two ratings are
normally needed for the issuance of bonds, the gains of Moody’s do not come at the
expense of S&P and vice versa. Id.
253. Hunt, supra note 250, at 133-34.
254. Id.
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The SEC has since continued its attempt to foster competition in the
ratings agency,255 however it remains clear that the big three firms are
here to stay.
In the arena of structured financial instruments, reputation plays
even less of a role because they have been rated by CRAs for a short
amount of time relative to more traditional debt instruments.256 As such,
investors may not necessarily associate imperfect ratings for CDOs with
the performance of traditional securities.257 Since these structured
products are so complex, most investors lack the ability to
independently value them to determine their true creditworthiness,
further clouding their judgment of a CRA’s reputation.258
2. SEC Rule 17g-5
The SEC promulgated Conflicts of Interest Rule, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.17g-5 (2012) (“Rule 17g-5”) to further control conflicts of interest
within CRAs.259 Enhanced disclosure is at the root of Rule 17g-5, which
prohibits NRSROs from some conflicts of interest unless they are
disclosed,260 expressly prohibits other conflicts,261 and requires rating
agencies to establish, maintain, and enforce procedures to address such
conflicts.262
Provisions relating to the maintenance of an internet website: Rule
17g-5 utilizes the free flow of information made possible by the internet
in order to ensure full disclosure of conflicts of interest as well as
material non-public information that is useful to other rating agencies
and the SEC.263 The complexity of structured debt securities led the SEC
to set more stringent disclosure requirements for credit ratings, including
requiring NRSROs to maintain a password-protected website detailing
the information provided by issuers, sponsors, or underwriters to the
255.
256.
257.
258.

See id. at 135.
See Mason & Rosner, supra note 227, at 10.
Hunt, supra note 250, at 172.
See TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, THE ROLE OF
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN STRUCTURED FINANCE MARKETS 2 (2008), http://www.ios
co.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD270.pdf [hereinafter IOSCO Report].
259. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(a) (2012).
260. Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(1).
261. See id. § 240.17g-5(c).
262. Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(2).
263. See id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(i).
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CRAs.264 The internet website provisions apply to NRSROs that rate
securities or money market instruments issued by an asset pool or as part
of asset-backed or mortgage-backed securities that are paid for by the
issuer.265 This is significant because the SEC formally recognizes the
inherent conflicts of the “issuer-pays” business model that has been
utilized by the major rating agencies for decades.266
The requisite information to be made available on the website
includes a list of each security for which a CRA is in the process of
generating an initial credit rating, details regarding the type of security,
the name of the issuer, the dates involved in the rating process, and the
specific internet address where the information above can be
accessed.267 More specifically, Rule 17g-5(a)(iii)(C) requires the issuer,
sponsor, or underwriter to:
Post . . . all information the issuer, sponsor, or underwriter provides
to the [NRSRO], or contracts with a third party to provide to the
[NRSRO], for the purpose of determining the initial credit rating for
the security . . . including information about the characteristics of the
assets underlying or referenced by the security . . . and the legal
structure of the security . . . at the same time such information is
provided to the [NRSRO]; and Post . . . all information the issuer,
sponsor, or underwriter provides to the [NRSRO] . . . for the purpose
of undertaking credit rating surveillance on the security . . . including
information about the characteristics and performance of the assets
underlying or referenced by the security . . . at the same time such
268
information is provided to the [NRSRO].

Provisions relating to certified access to the internet website: The
NRSRO must provide free and unlimited access to the website to any
other NRSRO which signs a certification stating that the information
will be kept confidential and treated as material nonpublic information,
addressing security concerns.269 In order to gain website access via
certification, the NRSRO providing the certification must have
“[d]etermined and maintained credit ratings for at least 10% of the
issued securities . . . for which it accessed information . . . in the
calendar year prior to the year covered by the certification, if it accessed
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id.
Id. § 240.17g-5(b)(9).
Id.
Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(i).
Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(iii)(C), (D).
Id. § 240.17g-5(e).
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such information for 10 or more issued securities or money market
instruments.”270 Alternatively, a certification may indicate that the
NRSRO providing the certification has not accessed the information ten
or more times in the recently ended calendar year.271 This basically
means that NRSROs who are given access to this information are either
constantly using it to rate securities, or barely using it at all.
In addition to requiring certification from other NRSROs, a rating
agency must also seek certain written representations from the issuers of
the securities under Rule 17g-5.272 Each issuer, sponsor, or underwriter
of the securities must furnish the NRSRO with a written representation
that it will present the information on the website in a manner that
designates which information can be relied upon in making
creditworthiness assessments.273 The issuer must also indicate that it will
provide access to the password-protected website to any NRSRO
meeting the above certification requirements.274
Provisions regarding types of conflicts that must be disclosed: Rule
17g-5(b) enumerates nine specific conflicts of interest which are
prohibited unless they are disclosed.275 A CRA must disclose when it
has been paid by issuers, underwriters, or obligors to determine credit
ratings of securities or money market instruments.276 A CRA must also
disclose whether it is being paid for additional services beyond normal
credit rating determinations.277 Payments to CRAs for subscriptions to
access or receive credit ratings by persons who may use the ratings to
comply with and obtain benefits or relief under statutes and regulations
utilizing the term “nationally recognized statistical rating organization”
must be disclosed.278 The same is true where the persons purchasing the
subscriptions may own investments or have entered into transactions
that could be impacted by a specific CRA’s credit rating.279 Full conflict
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(ii)(A).
Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(ii)(B).
Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(iii).
Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(i).
Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(iii)(B)(1), (2).
See id. § 240.17g-5(b). The conflicts of interest must be disclosed “in Exhibit 6
to Form NRSRO in accordance with section 15E(1)(1)(B)(vi) of the Act . . . and
§ 240.17g-1.” Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(1).
276.
Id. § 240.17g-5(b)(1), (2).
277.
Id. § 240.17g-5(b)(3).
278.
Id. § 240.17g-5(b)(4).
279.
Id. § 240.17g-5(b)(5).
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disclosure is also required where a credit rating has been set forth for a
security issued by an asset pool or as part of any ABS or MBS
transaction which was paid for by the issuer, sponsor, or underwriter.280
Ownership of securities rated by an NRSRO by persons within the
NRSRO is also prohibited unless disclosed.281 Rule 17g-5 defines
“person within an NRSRO” as “a nationally recognized statistical rating
organization, its credit rating affiliates identified on Form NRSRO, and
any partner, officer, director, branch manager, and employee of the
[NRSRO] or its credit rating affiliates (or any person occupying a
similar status or performing similar functions).”282 These provisions
target the close interpersonal relationships that can arise between
NRSROs and issuers, which are a breeding ground for conflicts of
interest. For example, direct ownership interests in issuers, obligors, and
the securities themselves by persons within the NRSRO are a listed
conflict of interest.283 Further, relationships beyond an “arms length
ordinary course of business relationship” between NRSRO employees
and issuers subject to a credit rating by the NRSRO are conflicts.284 A
person associated with an NRSRO who is a broker or dealer in the
business of underwriting securities must also disclose that fact.285 A final
catch-all provision is listed as the tenth enumerated conflict within this
category, and requires disclosure of any other conflict of interest that is
material to the NRSRO.286
Provisions regarding types of conflicts that are absolutely
prohibited: While some NRSRO conflicts are permissible if disclosed,
those listed under Rule 17g-5(c) are expressly prohibited.287 An NRSRO
cannot issue or maintain a credit rating that has been solicited by a
person that has provided 10% (or greater) of the NRSRO’s total net
revenue in the most recently ended fiscal year.288 This would prevent an
issuer from being able to easily solicit favorable ratings for securities on
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id. § 240.17g-5(b)(9).
Id. § 240.17g-5(b)(6).
Id. § 240.17g-5(d).
Id. § 240.17g-5(b)(6).
Id. § 240.17g-5(b)(7). These conflicts have not been expressly prohibited due
to the difficulty of defining the boundaries of relationships in the ordinary course of
business. This is more of a case-by-case determination. Bai, supra note 241, at 274.
285. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(b)(8).
286. Id. § 240.17g-5(b)(10).
287. Id. § 240.17g-5(c).
288. Id. § 240.17g-5(c)(1).
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the basis of generating a large portion of the NRSRO’s total revenue. It
is also prohibited to issue or maintain a credit rating to a person
(excluding sovereign nations) where the NRSRO, including any analysts
who participated in determining the rating or were responsible for
approving it, directly owns securities or other interests in the person
subject to the credit rating.289 Ownership of a security can directly skew
analysts’ objectivity when making determinations that can favorably or
adversely impact the security’s value.290 Further, issuing ratings where a
credit analyst—or someone responsible for approving ratings—serves as
an officer or director of the entity being rated is not permitted.291
NRSROs are precluded from issuing ratings with respect to any person
associated with the NRSRO292 as the market derives little value from
credit ratings issued by agencies having a direct affiliation with
underwriters or issuers.
Where an NRSRO or a person associated with it has “made
recommendations to the obligor or the issuer, underwriter, or sponsor of
the security about the corporate or legal structure, assets, liabilities, or
activities of the obligor or issuer of the security,” the NRSRO may not
issue or maintain a credit rating for that obligor or security.293 This
reflects belief by the SEC that an NRSRO cannot maintain an objective
viewpoint when it essentially rates its own work.294 Rule 17g-5(c) also
forbids a rating from being issued where the same person is involved in
both the credit rating determination process and the fee negotiation
process within the NRSRO.295 This is intended to keep the people who
negotiate fees insulated from those who are directly involved in the
rating process, to defeat the possibility of giving more favorable
treatment to certain high-paying issuers.296 Lastly, anyone within an
NRSRO involved in the determination, monitoring, or approval of a
credit rating is forbidden from receiving gifts exceeding $25.00,
289.
290.

Id. § 240.17g-5(c)(2).
See id. Indeed, it is easy to see how ownership of a security would provide a
financial incentive for inflating its credit rating.
291.
Id. § 240.17g-5(c)(4).
292.
Id. § 240.17g-5(c)(3).
293.
Id. § 240.17g-5(c)(5).
294. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59342, 74 Fed. Reg. 6,456, 6,465 (Feb. 9,
2009).
295. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(c)(6).
296. See id.
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including entertainment, from the obligor, issuer, underwriter, or
sponsor of the securities being rated.297 The SEC intended here to target
any potential undue influence arising from the exchange of gifts
between issuers and rating agency analysts.298
Responses to Rule 17g-5: Throughout the process of creating Rule
17g-5, the SEC received several responses to its proposals, most
generally supporting the disclosure requirements.299 One commenter
noted that these rules created a “level playing field” for the CRAs.300
Another supporter believed that the heightened levels of disclosure
would foster “true competition” in the industry.301 Regarding the
password protected internet website, one commenter stated that the
requirements for NRSROs to maintain the website are not unduly
burdensome on the agencies.302 On the issue of whether the information
on the NRSRO website would be sufficient to timely notify other
NRSROs that the rating process has begun, one commenter suggested
that the SEC requires non-hired NRSROs to be notified of new deals by
e-mail, or that the Commission initiates a pilot project aimed at getting
the information out to the non-hired NRSROs.303 The Commission did
not find this necessary, arguing that monitoring such a website would be
simple and not overly time-consuming for non-hired NRSROs.304
Numerous comments also disfavored the Rule 17g-5 proposals.
One commenter noted that these elevated disclosure requirements would
impose heavy costs on small originators of structured debt instruments,
causing them to abandon that market.305 Another commenter stated that
requiring such great disclosure creates an incentive for issuers to engage
in ratings shopping, choosing the NRSRO that would demand the least
amount of information in the rating process.306 However, the SEC takes
the view that its initiatives would remedy “ratings shopping by exposing

297.
298.
299.

Id.
Bai, supra note 241, at 276.
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-61050, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,832, 63,843 (Dec. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Final NRSRO
Rules].
300. Id. (quoting Riskmetrics Statement).
301. Id. (quoting Egan-Jones Statement).
302. Id. at 63,845 (quoting ABA Committee letter).
303. Id. (citing DBRS letter).
304. Id, at 63,846.
305. Id. at 63,843 (citing R&I letter).
306. Id. (citing Moody’s letter).
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an NRSRO that employed less conservative rating methodologies in
order to gain business.”307 Further, the SEC proposals were believed to
mitigate the potential effects of rating shopping, because non-hired
NRSROs can nonetheless issue their own credit ratings.308
The SEC acknowledges that the nonpublic nature of certain
information regarding structured finance products often results in a
rating from only one or two NRSROs.309 To combat this, Rule 17g-5 and
its amendments are designed to make certain information more available
to other NRSROs, which can provide a check on conflicts of interest and
increase transparency.310 By increasing the available credit ratings for a
security, users are given more opinions on its creditworthiness.311
Further, the SEC notes that “opening up the rating process to more
NRSROs will make it easier for the hired NRSRO to resist [pressure
from issuers] by increasing the likelihood that any steps taken to
inappropriately favor the arranger could be exposed to the market
through credit ratings issued by other NRSROs.”312
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AS A DEFENSE
1. Introduction
Can a complex credit rating for a structured debt instrument
calculated using advanced algorithms and methodologies be likened to a
restaurant review in a newspaper? How about an editorial column? The
major CRAs seem to think so.313
Faced with lawsuits by disgruntled investors seeking redress, major
CRAs employ the shield of the First Amendment to defend claims of
responsibility for losses and fraud.314 Standard & Poor’s, Fitch, and
Moody’s each awarded the best possible ratings to billions of dollars of
structured debt products that tanked along with the collapse of the
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. at 63,844.
Id.
Id. at 63,844.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Segal, supra note 4.
Id.
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United States housing market.315 Since the collapse, major CRAs have
had to explain why the debt of companies like Lehman Brothers and
A.I.G. were given “the Wall Street equivalent of gold stars” prior to the
collapse of Lehman and the rescue of A.I.G.316 The skepticism toward
misappropriated ratings dates further back, like in 2001, when NRSROs
came under fire for delaying their recognition of Enron’s
creditworthiness deterioration.317 Investors were never given an early
warning and by waiting to act until the company’s bond value fell hard
and fast, NRSROs failed to properly anticipate Enron’s financial
issues.318
The Supreme Court of the United States has yet to specifically
address whether credit ratings are protected speech pursuant to the First
Amendment.319 However, the Court offered some insight on the First
Amendment issue in the case of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss.320
In Greenmoss, a defamation suit was brought on the basis of a false
credit report.321 The central issue was whether the defamatory statements
were a matter of public concern, which would raise the requisite
standard of proof to actual malice.322 For matters of public concern, a
plaintiff in a defamation suit must prove the defendant’s “knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth” in order to meet the actual
malice standard.323 The Court in Greenmoss looked to the “content,
form, and context” of the speech at issue, holding that the report was not
a matter of public concern, and would not receive constitutional speech
protection.324 The report was available to only five subscribers and
targeted a limited audience, factors which more resembled private
speech in the Court’s view.325 Thus, when ratings are considered public
in nature, the “actual malice” standard will be applied against the
CRAs.326 Moody’s has stated that stripping First Amendment protection

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id.
Id.
Covitz & Harrison, supra note 220, at 3.
Id. at 4.
Partnoy, supra 3, at 59,85.
472 U.S. 749 (1985).
Id. at 751-52.
Id. at 751.
Id.
Id. at 761, 763.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 762.
In re Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. 577, 583-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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from CRAs would impose damage on the financial service markets,
emphasizing that credit ratings are matters of public concern.327 Some
courts have deemed credit ratings matters of public concern on the based
on the increasing role of corporate debt in the stability of financial
markets.328
2. Rating Agencies’ Arguments for
Freedom of Speech Protection
NRSROs contend that just as a journalist’s expression of his or her
opinion is protected speech under the First Amendment, their credit
ratings are also opinions entitled to the same protection.329 They have
likened themselves to newspapers, because they too serve the public by
“formulat[ing] opinions about those issuers and securities and broadly
disseminat[ing] those opinions, which are of concern to the public.”330
They say this to receive the highest free speech standard of actual
malice, requiring proof that a defendant acted “with knowledge that the
statement was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or
not.”331 Floyd Abrams, a famous First Amendment lawyer hired to
defend S&P, stated that “the major similarity here is that both the
newspaper and S&P are offering opinions on matters that people can
and do disagree about.”332 In defense of allegations of fraud and false
misrepresentation against S&P, Abrams contends that the law protects
forward-looking statements so long as the NRSRO truly believed its
own ratings.333 Again relying on the analogy to editorials, Abrams
claims that you cannot sue economists or meteorologists making
predictions for the future, therefore you should not be able to sue an
NRSRO, “[e]ven if those ratings are wrong, or the company did a lousy
job, you can’t bring a lawsuit against someone for offering forwardlooking predictions.”334

327.
2008).
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 639 (S.D. Ohio
In re Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 818-19 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
Segal, supra note 4.
In re Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 810.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
Segal, supra note 4.
Id.
Id.
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Rating agencies have successfully argued that investor reliance on
their credit ratings is unreasonable.335 They have been insistent that
ratings are “not a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any [securities]
and may be subject to revision or withdrawal at any time,” a disclaimer
which is often attached to ratings.336 The reliance argument is essential
to NRSROs’ constitutional defense, because where speech proposes a
commercial transaction, it is considered “commercial speech” and
constitutional protections for this speech are narrowed.337 In a 2009
letter to the SEC, famous First Amendment attorney Laurence Tribe
distinguishes credit ratings from promotional advertising, stating that
“NRSRO ratings, by contrast, are independent evaluations that do not
propose any transaction.”338 Tribe cites Lowe v. SEC,339 which held that
“expression of opinion about a commercial product” is a matter of
public concern, extending First Amendment protections to “opinions”
about marketable securities.340 Applying this precedent, he agrees that a
registration statement and prospectus can be considered commercial
speech, but argues that this does not extend to an NRSRO’s opinion
about a security.341
A credit rating concerns an economic subject, of course. But it is not
an advertisement that seeks to encourage investors to purchase an
instrument; it merely provides information to investors to enable
them to evaluate whether or not to engage in a transaction. Literally
countless articles in publications such as the Wall Street Journal and
Bloomberg serve an indistinguishable function by providing still
other information to potential investors. Indeed . . . NRSROs
consistently state in their ratings that their opinions have a limited
role and are not recommendations to purchase, sell, or hold
securities. In this respect, a credit rating is “closely analogous to a

335.
336.
337.

Quinn v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 168 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 333.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 56263 (1980); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983);
Virginia State Bd. Of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976).
338. Letter from Laurence Tribe and Thomas Goldstein, to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, (Dec. 14, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/co
mments/s7-24-09/s72409-13.pdf [hereinafter Tribe Letter].
339. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
340. Id. at 210 n.58 (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S. Inc., 466 U.S.
485, 513 (1984)).
341. Tribe letter, supra note 338, at 6.
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restaurant or performance review, or a Consumer Reports article, in
342
the context of the [investment markets].”

Tribe further argues that extending Section 11 liability to NRSROs
would subject them to strict liability for their ratings, leaving only the
defense that the NRSRO was not negligent.343 He contends that this
level of liability unfairly shifts the burden of proof to NRSROs, who
must prove they acted with due care, rather than the plaintiff having to
prove the defendant’s “actual malice” in typical proceedings regarding
matters of public concern.344 Facing “crushing liability” to the investing
community, Tribe argues that “NRSROs rationally would often make
the choice simply not to speak, to the great detriment of the public
markets.”345
It is also argued that a change in NRSROs’ business models would
do nothing to remedy the First Amendment liability issue.346 Despite the
inherent conflicts of the issuer-pays model, it is unrealistic to expect that
NRSROs will be able to generate significant revenue by reverting to a
subscriber-pays model.347 Laurence Tribe notes significant changes in
technology—such as photocopying and the internet—as reasons for why
the subscriber-pays model is not feasible: it has become easier for nonsubscribers to “free ride” on the issued rating information.348 Further, a
small investor base paying for subscriptions to ratings could not
342. Id. (citing Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. CFTC, 149 F.3d 679, 686 (7th Cir.
1998)).
343. Id. at 8.
344. Id. at 9 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 244 (1986)
(stating that pursuant to the First Amendment, plaintiffs are required to prove that
defendants acted with actual malice by clear and convincing evidence)).
345. Id. at 10. In his letter to the SEC, Laurence Tribe further argues that not only
may NRSROs be reluctant to issue credit ratings, but they may also distort their own
ratings in order to avoid lawsuits by disgruntled investors, resulting in a chilling effect
on speech.
At best, NRSROs would face perverse incentives either to artificially inflate the
assessment of risks, fearing investor suits when rated investments lose value, or to
artificially discount those risks, fearing suits by issuers pointing fingers of blame at
those who did not issue ratings favorable enough to permit them to succeed in the
market. . . . The upshot would be ratings distorted to an unpredictable degree and in
an unpredictable direction. But the entirely predictable result would be to render
capital markets less informed and less efficient.

Tribe letter, supra note 338, at 11.
346. Id. at 19.
347. Id.
348. Id.
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adequately cover the depth of analyses necessary to formulate and
publish credit ratings.349 The seven registered NRSROs utilizing the
issuer-pays model account for about 99% of the total outstanding credit
ratings issued by all ten registered NRSROs.350 Forcing NRSROs to
adopt the subscriber-pays model would further violate the First
Amendment, Tribe says, because a speaker is entitled to protection for
the speech itself as well as how the message is delivered.351
3. Arguments Against Freedom of Speech Protection
In a 2002 Enron report, the SEC stated that “credit rating agencies
seem to be trying to walk a fine line between maintaining their
enormous market power through both official and unofficial uses of
their ratings, and insisting their ratings are purely their ‘opinion.’”352
Rating agencies have had to defend their “opinions” against numerous
claims including common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, and aiding and abetting.353 But are they really “opinions”?
The actual malice standard, consistently applied to NRSROs in
court, lacks any objective reasonable person standard.354 Under the
lesser negligence standard, a rating agency could face liability for not
investigating when a reasonable person would have investigated.355 As
long as the actual malice standard is applied to NRSROs, they cannot be

349.
350.

Id.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Annual Report on Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organizations: As Required by Section 6 of the Credit Rating Agency Reform
Act of 2006, 6 (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ratinga
gency/nrsroannrep0111.pdf.
351. Tribe letter, supra note 338, at 20 (citing Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S.
147, 163 (1939)).
It would turn this core First Amendment principle on its head to justify the imposition
of strict liability (or even negligence-based liability) for NRSRO ratings – which are
currently available without cost to the public at large – with the observation that
NRSROs could in theory avoid such liability by selling their ratings to the narrow
class of investors who might afford their substantial cost.

Id. at 22.
352. Watchdogs, supra note 19, at 123.
353. Abu Dhabi Com. Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155,
163 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
354. In re Enron Corp. Sec., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 811 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
355. Id.
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held
liable
for
negligent
misrepresentation.356
Negligent
misrepresentation, a state-specific tort, requires that plaintiffs
“justifiably rely on the false information when the agency supplies it for
the guidance of others in their business transaction and fails to exercise
reasonable competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.”357 However, as long as courts seek to protect ratings’
public function by accepting a First Amendment defense, credit ratings
will continue to be treated as opinions.
Several problems exist with the “opinions” defense. The main
difference between credit ratings and a newspaper editorial or a weather
forecast is that CRAs are paid by the companies they rate and know
their ratings are being relied upon by investors. A meteorologist has no
financial stake in telling the public “It’s going to be sunny.”358
Meanwhile, rating agencies “get paid by the people who need a
prediction of clear skies, and the customers can always ask a different
forecaster if they don’t hear what they like.”359 Furthermore, there are
numerous statutes requiring institutions to rely on ratings by law.360 This
underscores the commercial importance of the ratings and elevates them
above a weather forecast.361
Regarding the issue of fraud, S&P defends that it was just as
surprised as everyone else when its ratings “didn’t pan out.”362 However,
that defense is questionable at best. The rating agencies likely had an
idea that they were helping sell packaged loans that sub-prime
mortgagors simply could not repay. That model of residential mortgagebacked securities revolved around the notion that housing prices would
continue to rise annually by double digit percentages. This was an
unrealistic expectation that NRSROs could have seen coming. With the
poor creditworthiness of sub-prime mortgagors, it would be hard to
convince most investors to purchase RMBS securities packaged with
sub-prime mortgages. But S&P and others likely knew the extent of
their own influence, realizing that issuing a favorable rating was a
“golden ticket” for enabling the banks to sell these bundled loans in the
356.
357.

Id.
Arthur R. Pinto, Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies in the
United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 341, 353 (2006).
358. Segal, supra note 4.
359. Id.
360. Id.; Watchdogs, supra note 19, at 102.
361. Segal, supra note 4.
362. Id.
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secondary market. Credit ratings became a self-fulfilling prophecy.
NRSROs profited handsomely by issuing ratings as high as AAA for
Issuing
securities that realistically amounted to junk bonds.363
misleading ratings should have crippled rating agencies’ client base and
reputation. However, due to the success of their tissue-thin First
Amendment defense, they remain economically strong and poised to
repeat history. As one blogger writes, continued protection from
liability—including on First Amendment grounds—is quite fallacious:
The notion that credit agencies should be immune to prosecution
when they are clearly complicit in fraud by awarding investment
grades to investments that they knew were not investment grade is as
daft as the notion that a con artist should be immune to prosecution
364
because the mark should [have] known that it was a con.

4. Abu Dhabi and Future Accountability for Ratings
Decided in 2009, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley
& Co., Inc.365 departed from the traditional application of the First
Amendment to rating agencies.366 In Abu Dhabi, a class of institutional
investors sought to recover financial losses originating from the
liquidation of notes that were issued by an SIV, or structured investment
vehicle.367 Among the defendants were CRAs, a bank, and a placement
agency.368 The notes at issue were given top-notch ratings: Moody’s and
S&P both rated them “AAA.”369 The ratings were disclosed by Morgan
Stanley in a SIV Information Memoranda issued to potential
investors.370 The SIV collapsed in 2007 during the credit crisis, as it
became apparent that the subprime mortgages securing the rated notes

363. See Jeannette Neumann and Jean Eaglesham, SEC Eyes Ratings From S&P
Regulators Scrutinize ‘Dummy’ Assets in Investments Marked as Triple-A, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 27, 2011, at C1. For example, in January of 2008, Moody’s downgraded the CDO
Delphinus from triple-A to junk status, with S&P doing the same in February.
364. Enablers of Fraud, BADTUX THE SNARKY PENGUIN BLOG (Mar. 8, 2011),
available at http://snarkypenguin.blogspot.com/2011/03/enablers-of-fraud.html.
365. Abu Dhabi Com. Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
366. Id. at 175-76.
367. Id. at 163.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 165.
370. Id. at 165-66.
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were of low quality and value.371 Unable to repay the notes’ senior debt
when it was due, the SIV declared bankruptcy in August 2007.372
Plaintiffs’ causes of action included common law fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
contract, unjust enrichment, and aiding and abetting.373 Predictably, the
defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.374
The motion was granted in part and denied in part.375 The importance of
Abu Dhabi lies in U.S. District Judge Shira Scheindlin’s denial of the
motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims against the CRAs and placement
agency for fraud stemming from the SIV’s credit rating.376
The defendant rating agencies contested that the misrepresentation
claims were nonactionable due to the immunity of ratings pursuant to
the First Amendment, and because the ratings were nonactionable
opinions.377 Rejecting this argument, the Court stated:
It is well-established that under typical circumstances, the First
Amendment protects rating agencies, subject to an “actual malice”
exception, from liability arising out of their issuance of ratings and
reports because their ratings are considered matters of public
concern. However, where a rating agency has disseminated their
ratings to a select group of investors rather than to the public at
large, the rating agency is not afforded the same protection. Here,
plaintiffs have plainly alleged that the Cheyne SIV’s ratings were
never widely disseminated, but were provided instead in connection
with a private placement to a select group of investors. Thus, the
Rating Agencies’ First Amendment argument is rejected.
I also reject the argument that the Rating Agencies’ ratings in this
case are nonactionable opinions. “[A]n opinion may still be
actionable if the speaker does not genuinely and reasonably believe
it or if it is without basis in fact.” For the reasons discussed below,
plaintiffs have sufficiently pled that the Rating Agencies did not
genuinely or reasonably believe that the ratings they assigned to the
Rated Notes were accurate and had a basis in fact. As a result, the

371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

Id. at 168.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 163-64.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 175.

2012]

BELOW THE INVESTMENT GRADE
AND ABOVE THE LAW

1111

Rating Agencies’ ratings were not mere opinions but rather
378
actionable misrepresentations.

The Court also rejected the defense that CRA disclaimers about the
use of ratings should make the plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims
nonactionable:
For the same reasons, the disclaimers in the Information Memoranda
that “[a] credit rating represents a Rating Agency’s opinion
regarding credit quality and is not a guarantee of performance or a
recommendation to buy, sell or hold any securities,” are unavailing
and insufficient to protect the Rating Agencies from liability for
promulgating misleading ratings. I conclude that plaintiffs have
sufficiently alleged that the ratings issued by the Rating Agencies on
379
the Rated Notes are actionable misstatements.

The holding that the First Amendment applies only to statements by
rating agencies issued to the general public380 is a move in the right
direction regarding increased liability for losses stemming from
overrated securities. Where a statement is private or made to a select
group of people, as in the ratings circulated to investors in Abu Dhabi,
no such constitutional protection applies.381 The court relies on Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss, noting that the ratings at issue were not a
matter of public concern because they were only distributed to a limited
group of investors.382 Effects of Abu Dhabi will likely be felt in the
structured finance arena because many RMBS and almost all CDOs are
sold in private placements. The Abu Dhabi decision will have an
expanding impact on liability in future fraud cases against CRAs.
If the First Amendment defense continues to hold up in court, the
reputation of NRSROs is unlikely to be rehabilitated. Rather, the
“opinion” defense will be perceived as a slick legal tactic, further
exposing that rating agencies did not know much about what their own
ratings meant.

378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

Id. at 175-76.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 175-76.
Id. at 175-76.
Id. at 176 n.120.
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B. THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT OF 2010
Congress issued a series of unprecedented regulations for CRAs
with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010.383 The Act seeks to increase transparency,
impose guidelines for corporate governance, address conflicts of
interest, and improve the ratings process overall.384 It provides the SEC
with greater power to oversee and enforce laws, and seeks to ease the
ability of investors to bring civil suits against rating agencies.385 Further,
Dodd-Frank aims to reduce investor reliance on credit ratings by
promoting use of broader criteria in evaluating credit quality.386 The Act
begins with a statement of its purpose:
To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘‘too
big to fail”, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to
protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for
387
other purposes.

Under Section 931, titled “Improvements to the Regulation of
Credit Rating Agencies,” Congress identifies its findings regarding the
role of CRAs:
Because of the systemic importance of credit ratings and the reliance
placed on credit ratings by individual and institutional investors and
financial regulators, the activities and performances of credit rating
agencies . . . are matters of national public interest, as credit rating
agencies are central to capital formation, investor confidence, and
the efficient performance of the United States economy.
Credit rating agencies . . . play a critical ‘‘gatekeeper’’ role in the
debt market that is functionally similar to that of securities analysts,
383. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
384. SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES, THE DODDFRANK ACT: COMMENTARY AND INSIGHTS 73 (2010), available at http://www.skadden.
com/Cimages/sitefile/Skadden_Insights_Special_Edition_Dodd-Frank_Act1.pdf
[hereinafter Dodd-Frank Commentary].
385. Id.
386. Id.
387.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 931, 124 Stat. 1376.
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who evaluate the quality of securities in the equity market, and
auditors, who review the financial statements of firms. Such role
justifies a similar level of public oversight and accountability.
Because credit rating agencies perform evaluative and analytical
services on behalf of clients, much as other financial ‘‘gatekeepers’’
do, the activities of credit rating agencies are fundamentally
commercial in character and should be subject to the same standards
of liability and oversight as apply to auditors, securities analysts, and
investment bankers.
In certain activities, particularly in advising arrangers of structured
financial products on potential ratings of such products, credit rating
agencies face conflicts of interest that need to be carefully monitored
and that therefore should be addressed explicitly in legislation in
order to give clearer authority to the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
In the recent financial crisis, the ratings on structured financial
products have proven to be inaccurate. This inaccuracy contributed
significantly to the mismanagement of risks by financial institutions
and investors, which in turn adversely impacted the health of the
economy in the United States and around the world. Such inaccuracy
necessitates increased accountability on the part of credit rating
388
agencies.

1. Corporate Governance and Conflicts of Interest
Pursuant to the Act, CRAs are required to establish and enforce
internal controls governing the implementation of and adherence to their
policies and procedures for determining credit ratings.389 Annual internal
controls reports shall be submitted to the Commission, which must
describe the management’s responsibility in maintaining the internal
control structure and assess the effectiveness of the structures put in
place.390 In order to ensure the accuracy of ratings, the Act orders the
Commission to set forth qualification standards for credit analysts to
make certain that they meet the standards of training, experience, and
competence necessary to produce accurate credit ratings.391

388.
389.
390.
391.

Id. at 1872.
Id. § 932(a).
Id.
Id. § 936.

1114

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVII

To avoid conflicts of interest, each NRSRO must maintain an
independent board of directors, meaning that at least half (but not fewer
than two) of the board members must be independent of the NRSRO.392
The compensation for these independent board members cannot be
linked to the NRSRO’s business performance in order to ensure their
independent judgment.393 The Act further targets conflicts of interest by
calling for the SEC to issue rules aimed at preventing sales and
marketing considerations from influencing an NRSRO’s production of
credit ratings.394 If the SEC finds (after a hearing) that an NRSRO has
violated this rule, and the violation affected a rating, a credit rating
agency could have its NRSRO status suspended or even revoked.395
Additionally, rating agencies must retroactively address conflicts of
interest by establishing policies targeted at ensuring that former NRSRO
employees did not succumb to conflicts during their employment.396 The
agencies must conduct reviews to determine whether conflicts existed,
and subsequently take necessary action to revise any rating improperly
influenced by a former employee.397
How will the SEC administer these regulations and ensure their
compliance? The Act calls for the creation of an Office of Credit
Ratings, charged with promoting accuracy and preventing conflicts of
interest.398 The new Office of Credit Ratings is to be “staffed sufficiently
to carry out fully the requirements of this section. The staff shall include
persons with knowledge of and expertise in corporate, municipal, and
structured debt finance.”399 The Office must conduct examinations of
each NRSRO at least annually.400 Annual reports are also to be made
available to the public, detailing the Office’s findings and subsequent
responses by NRSROs to address “material regulatory deficiencies.”401
Congress further encourages the SEC to exercise its rulemaking
authority in order to prevent conflicts of interest arising out of the
provision of services to issuers unrelated to the actual issuance of credit
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

Id. § 932(a).
Id. at 1376.
Id. § 932(a).
Id.
Id. § 932(a)(4).
Id.
Id. at 1877.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ratings, such as consulting and advisory services.402 Congress
empowered the SEC with the ability to temporarily suspend or
permanently revoke the NRSRO status of any NRSRO that “does not
have adequate financial and managerial resources to consistently
produce credit ratings with integrity.”403
2. Changes to the Credit Ratings Process
The Dodd-Frank Act also addresses procedures and methodologies
used by CRAs.404 The Act charges the SEC with the task of issuing rules
“for the protection of investors and in the public interest.”405 NRSROs
are required to have their procedures and methodologies approved by
their board.406 Using a standardized form, rating agencies are required to
publicly disclose certain information including their rating
methodologies, the issuer’s data used to calculate a rating, and
underlying assumptions in order to increase transparency.407
Additionally, issuers and underwriters of asset-backed securities shall
disclose any findings from third-party due diligence reports the issuer
has obtained.408
Congress also sought to increase transparency in the performance
of credit ratings.409 This is achieved by requiring public disclosure of
information on initial ratings as well as subsequent changes to those
ratings, allowing investors to evaluate an NRSRO’s accuracy and also
compare ratings performance among different NRSROs.410 The Act also
calls for NRSROs to consider credible and significant data from outside
sources in calculating ratings, broadening the scope of ratings beyond
issuer-provided data.411
Acknowledging the complexity of structured finance products, the
Dodd-Frank Act tasks the SEC with conducting a study of the ratings
process for structured products, conflicts of interest inherent in the
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.

Id. § 939H.
Id. at 1874.
Id. § 932(a)(8).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1881.
Id. § 932(a)(8).
Id.
Id. § 935.
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issuer-pay and subscriber-pay models, and other related issues.412 No
later than two years after the enactment of Dodd-Frank, the SEC is to
submit its findings to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the
House of Representatives.413 The SEC’s report will also contain
recommendations for changes necessary to implement the findings,
whether regulatory or statutory.414 Congress goes a step further by
attempting to tackle “ratings shopping” in an unprecedented way,
allowing the SEC to potentially change how a security’s initial rating
will be selected:
After submission of the report under subsection (c), the Commission
shall, by rule, as the Commission determines is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors,
establish a system for the assignment of [NRSROs] to determine the
initial credit ratings of structured finance products, in a manner that
prevents the issuer, sponsor, or underwriter of the structured finance
product from selecting the [NRSRO] that will determine the initial
415
credit ratings and monitor such credit ratings.

3. Increased Potential Liability
As discussed earlier, one of the most significant laws concerning
CRAs’ liability was former Rule 436(g), which is formally repealed by
the Dodd-Frank Act.416 Section 939G of the Act reads “Rule 436(g),
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the
Securities Act of 1933, shall have no force or effect.”417 This provision
exposes CRAs to liability as experts under Section 11 of the Securities
Act for consenting to the disclosure of their ratings in a registration
statement.418 It is likely that stripping 436(g) protection from rating
agencies reflects the view of Congress that rating agencies act as experts
and should face liability as such.
In Section 933, the Act applies the enforcement and penalty
provisions of the Exchange Act onto rating agencies, allowing for civil
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.

Id. § 939F(b).
Id. at 1889.
Id.
Id. § 939F(d).
Id. § 939G.
Id.
Id. at 1890.
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suits against CRAs.419 This effectively subjects rating agencies to the
same penalty standards as public accountants and securities analysts.420
Congress further exposes rating agencies to liability by altering certain
culpability requirements for civil suits:
The Act alters the pleading standards that were implemented by the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 as applied to
actions for money damages against rating agencies. Under the
standards in place prior to the enactment of the Act, to survive a
motion to dismiss a claim based on Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff had to
allege facts giving rise to a “strong inference” that the defendant
knowingly or recklessly made a material misstatement or omission.
In the context of credit ratings, courts required plaintiffs to plead that
the rating agency did not genuinely believe its opinions regarding
credit quality or that the opinions lacked basis in fact. Plaintiffs were
often unable to satisfy this pleading burden in actions against rating
agencies. Under the Act, a pleading against a rating agency would
satisfy the state-of-mind requirement if it alleges facts with
particularity giving rise to a strong inference that the rating agency
knowingly or recklessly “failed to conduct a reasonable
investigation” of the factual elements relied upon in evaluating the
credit risk of the rated security. The determination of what
constitutes a “reasonable investigation” will be based on a court’s
421
consideration of the particular facts and circumstances.

The Dodd-Frank Act also changes certain Exchange Act language
to state that rating agencies must “file” their registration applications
with the SEC, rather than “furnish” them, thereby subjecting agencies to
Section 18 of the Exchange Act, which affords a civil remedy for
misleading statements contained in certain documents filed with the
SEC.422
419.
420.

Id. § 933(a).
Id. Section 933(a) also notes that agencies’ statements are not deemed forwardlooking statements, excluding ratings from the certain safe harbor provisions of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:
The enforcement and penalty provisions of this title shall apply to statements made by
a credit rating agency in the same manner and to the same extent as such provisions
apply to statements made by a registered public accounting firm or a securities analyst
under the securities laws, and such statements shall not be deemed forward-looking
statements for the purposes of section 21E.

Id.
421.
422.

Dodd-Frank Commentary, supra note 385, at 75 (emphasis added).
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 932(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1877 (2010).
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Though the extent of rating agencies’ future liability remains
unclear, these provisions of Dodd-Frank at least recognize that NRSROs
are part of our economic problem and must be held accountable for their
statements. Congress has taken a step in the right direction by giving the
SEC more power to regulate CRAs. By requiring additional disclosure
to the public and removing NRSRO exemptions from expert liability,
Congress is sending a message to the major CRAs: You are no longer
untouchable, and should be liable for materially misleading or
overstated credit ratings. How the Dodd-Frank Act will impact liability
is largely contingent on the future success of rating agencies’ First
Amendment “opinion” defense. Congress has initiated the momentum
and it is now up to the judicial system to follow through with heightened
civil liability.
4. Reducing Reliance on Credit Ratings
The Dodd-Frank Act seeks to reduce reliance on credit ratings by
removing certain statutory references to phrases like “investment
grade,” and encourages institutional investors to utilize their own due
diligence to eliminate sole reliance on ratings.423 For example,
benchmark references to credit ratings are altered in the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and
Soundness Act of 1932, Investment Company Act of 1940, and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.424 Many of the changes replace the
phrase “rated investment grade” or “rated in one of the two highest
rating categories by at least one NRSRO” with “meets standards of
creditworthiness as established by the Commission,” leaving an openended standard that relies less on ratings.425 Additionally, Section 939A
of the Dodd-Frank Act calls for each federal agency to review the
regulations they issue and modify regulations making benchmark
references to credit ratings by removing those references and
substituting the standard of credit-worthiness that each agency
determines is appropriate for such regulations.426 The Act sets a firm
timeline of one year after the enactment of Section 939A for agencies to

423.
424.
425.
426.

Id. § 939, 939A.
Id. § 939.
See id.
Id. § 939A.
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conduct such a review.427 Lastly, the Act removes the exemption for
CRAs from Regulation FD regarding information that has been provided
to the agencies.428
5. The SEC’s Implementation of Dodd-Frank Provisions
After the passage of Dodd-Frank, how has the Commission
adjusted its staffing and funding to accommodate its new power?
According to an internal review conducted over several months by
Boston Consulting Group, the SEC has been too slow to adapt:
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is short some 400
employees needed for the regulator to manage its current workload,
according to a draft of a four-month internal review by Boston
Consulting Group obtained by Bloomberg News. The review,
required by the Dodd-Frank Act, backs the claim by SEC officials
that the agency is underfunded and understaffed as it includes in its
oversight derivatives, credit rating companies and municipal bonds.
The study said staffing levels had been on a downward trend since
2005. To address the manpower shortage, Boston Consulting
reportedly recommended shifting managers to front-line or support
staff roles. The consulting firm also reportedly suggested hiring
temporary workers. However, because of the House Republican cuts
on federal spending to 2008 levels, a major budget hike for SEC to
429
hire more workers has small chances of being approved.

Unfortunately, the lack of resources at the SEC undermines the
congressional objectives laid out in the Dodd-Frank Act and minimizes
its potential impact on holding agencies more accountable for their
ratings.430 However, once the SEC is better equipped to handle the
ratings industry, it is certain that the sweeping changes laid out in DoddFrank will be a push in the right direction for dealing with rating
agencies. In the meantime, it remains unclear how stringent the SEC and
Congress will be in enforcing Dodd-Frank provisions, but it is apparent
that change needs to be made. Congress has laid the regulatory
427.
428.
429.

Id. at 1887.
Id. § 939B.
Robert Schmidt & Jesse Hamilton, SEC ‘Capacity Gap’ Risks Oversight
Lapses as Regulator’s Targets Multiply, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 7, 2011 12:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-07/sec-capacity-gap-risks-oversight-lapsesas-regulator-s-targets-multiply.html.
430. Id.
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framework with the Dodd-Frank Act, and it is now up to the SEC to
exercise its muscle to increase CRAs’ transparency, accountability, and
liability.
C. THE EUROPEAN APPROACH TO
CREDIT RATING AGENCY REGULATION
Similar to the United States, Europe is facing the daunting task of
regulating CRAs, but employing a different approach.431 While the
United States has enacted stringent corporate governance rules which
seek to ensure full disclosure, the European Union (“EU”) has instead
opted to issue codes of ethics for its public companies.432 Such public
companies have the option of abiding by the code of ethics or disclosing
the reasons why they have chosen to avoid compliance.433 Further, US
regulations target disclosure differently than EU regulations:
By imposing corporate governance rules, the United States intends to
regulate disclosure on the ‘‘source,’’ thus assuring that information
is accurate. On the other side, by proposing codes of ethics under the
disclose or explain rule, the European Union does not address the
accuracy of the information itself, but widens the array of issues
434
which have to be disclosed.

The US issues sanctions for non-fulfillment of certain provisions by
the operation of law.435 The EU approach does not incorporate the law
until a company decides to neither comply nor explain its noncompliance.436
EU rulemaking in this area involves a two-tiered approach: the
“Winter Report” is the code of ethics at the EU level, while several
codes/regulations are also implemented at the national level.437 The
Winter Report encompasses a variety of issues including capital
formation, types of enterprises, and rules for investor protection and

431. Miguel Lamo de Espinosa Abarca, The Need for Substantive Regulation on
Investor Protection and Corporate Governance in Europe: Does Europe Need a
Sarbanes-Oxley?, 19 J. INT’L BANKING L. REG. 419, 422 (2004).
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id.
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corporate governance.438 The report regards disclosure obligations as a
paramount concern, under the assumption that increased disclosure
protects market transparency.439 Thus, its focus is “enhancing corporate
governance disclosure requirements for listed companies.”440 The
Winter Report acknowledges that disclosure is an area where selfregulation has been deficient.441 The following recommendations are
included in the Winter Report:
A descriptive statement of corporate governance structure must be
included in the annual accounts of the corporation. The statement
should make reference to a particular national code on corporate
governance (to be adopted by each Member State) and should
specify the extent to which deviations exist. The Board of Directors
will be responsible for any non-accuracies of such statement.
Additional disclosure obligations on corporate governance (to be
developed by each Member State) are established. Among others,
information on corporate governance rules, remuneration of
directors, compensation schemes, independence of directors and
their qualifications should be disclosed. Additional disclosure
obligations on corporate websites are also proposed.
The role of independent directors in the board (as well as in audit,
nomination, and remuneration committees) is revisited. The Winter
Report recommends a minimum standard for independent board
representation of 30 per cent (such a level is recommended to be
higher than 50 per cent when there are dispersed shareholders).
Additional rules on voting information and access to shareholder
meetings are proposed. Responsibilities of institutional investors are
revisited, mainly as regards their obligation to disclose investment
442
policies and the exercise of voting rights.

1. European Securities and Markets Authority
Effective January 1, 2011, the creation of a new regulatory body
titled the European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”) is the

438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
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European Commission’s most recent major financial reform.443 The
ESMA is part of a larger reform package that also includes formation of
the European Banking Authority and the European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority.444 Also created was a regulatory
agency to monitor possible threats to the financial system, titled the
European Systemic Risk Board (“ESRB”).445
With these new agencies, the EU seeks to prevent future financial
breakdowns like the most recent crisis. The European Parliament has
given the ESMA the necessary power to effect change by designating
the ESMA to take over the Committee of European Securities
Regulators (“CESR”), and by requiring EU Member States to adopt
legislative changes by December 31, 2011.446 With an eye on efficiency,
the EU Commission has integrated a review clause into the ESMA
Regulation, which will require submitting reports every three years to
address issues such as whether it is necessary to divide supervision into
segmented agencies (banking, insurance, occupational pensions,
securities and financial markets), whether it is beneficial to have each
authority based in the same city, and whether it is necessary to delegate
additional supervisory powers.447
Perhaps most striking about the ESMA is the unprecedented scope
of its power, encompassing both lawmaking and supervisory roles. The
ESMA’s influence will be apparent in the financial markets from top to
bottom. At the legislative stage, the ESMA can “develop drafts of
binding regulat[ions] and implement[] technical standards . . . .”448 At
the enforcement stage, it can “adopt a binding decision addressed
directly to a financial institution requiring it to take the necessary action
. . . .”449 Market participants are also offered a consultation process by
the ESMA.450 In the case of emergencies, the EU has empowered the
ESMA to order that necessary actions be taken by individual EU
Member States, subject to the Council’s ultimate approval.451 Beyond

443.
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446.
447.
448.
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Id.
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the aforementioned powers, the ESMA can also mediate among national
powers:
ESMA will be able to impose legally binding mediation in cases of
disagreements between national supervisors, and, if no agreement
can be reached, within the relevant college of supervisors. Where a
competent authority does not comply with ESMA’s decision, ESMA
may in certain cases directly impose supervisory decisions on the
financial institution concerned. ESMA will also be able to intervene
452
as a mediator at its own discretion.

a. ESMA and Credit Rating Agencies
The latest changes in the regulation of CRAs provide the ESMA
with significant oversight over the affairs of agencies all over the EU.
By July 2011, the ESMA was in direct supervision of CRAs.453 Known
as “dawn raids,” the ESMA can “conduct unannounced checks . . . at the
premises of a CRA, impose fines and [ ] ensure that agencies evaluate
the accuracy of their past ratings.”454 The element of surprise is likely to
instill a sense of urgency into CRAs and cause them to remedy any
potential doubts regarding the accuracy of their ratings. By July 2014,
all CRAs must be checked by the ESMA.455 It has the right to impose
fines proportionate to the type of infringement and surrounding
circumstances.456 In addition to monetary sanctions, “ESMA will also
have a number of other supervisory powers in cases of breach of the
CRA Regulation, ranging from the temporary prohibition of issuing
credit ratings to the withdrawal of the registration altogether.”457
If that much power was to be given to a governmental agency in the
United States, it could have a lasting impact on the accuracy of credit
ratings. It remains unclear whether the Dodd Frank Act’s creation of the
Office of Credit Ratings will have the potential to effectuate change as it
appears the ESMA does. Either way, we are on the right track in
creating an independent agency to specifically address credit rating
agency concerns.

452.
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V. CONCLUSION
As Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley correctly
pointed out:
The Dodd-Frank Act itself notes, in the findings of Section 931
(emphasis supplied):
(4) Because credit rating agencies perform evaluative and analytical
services on behalf of clients, much as other financial ‘gatekeepers’
do, the activities of credit rating agencies are fundamentally
commercial in character and should be subject to the same standards
of liability and oversight as apply to auditors, securities analysts,
and investment bankers,
(5) In the recent financial crisis, the ratings on structured financial
products have proven to be inaccurate. This inaccuracy contributed
significantly to the mismanagement of risks by financial institutions
and Investors, which in turn adversely impacted the health of the
economy in the United States and around the world. Such inaccuracy
necessitates increased accountability on the part of the credit rating
458
agencies.

The SEC in its no-action letter response to Ford Motor Credit,459
permitted the CRAs to bully not only the SEC, but to flout Congress,
and the will of the people of the United States. In short, the CRAs said,
if you will not play by the rules we want, we will take our ball and go
home. What the CRAs want is simple. They want to have their cake and
eat it too. They are, after all, above the law. They practically have no
liability for their ratings.460 According to them, their ratings are mere
opinions, like Zagat’s star ratings for a restaurant.461 They have recruited
458.
459.

See Coakley Letter, supra note 26.
Response from Katherine Hsu, Senior Counsel, Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, http://www.sec.gov/divisions
/corpfin/cf-noaction/2010/ford072210-1120.htm (last updated Nov. 23, 2010).
460. While former Rule 436(g) was in effect, rating agencies were legally exempt
from liability. Now that it has been repealed, there are still numerous obstacles in the
way of assigning liability to credit rating agencies, notably their successful First
Amendment defense.
461. However, Zagat surveys are not paid for by the restaurants reviewed, whereas
the CRAs are paid by the corporations whose securities they rate.
Zagat Survey content is based on the collective opinions of a worldwide network of
surveyors. The survey process begins with a local food expert who is hired to compile
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among the most famous and revered First Amendment scholars to
successfully defend their position.462
Recent history has shown that investors have relied on the CRA
ratings to their detriment (hence, “below investment grade” in the title of
this Article). Not only have they so relied, they (or their investment
managers) have in many cases been forced to rely on CRA ratings when
governing statutes or regulations require them to invest in “investment
grade” securities.463 “Investment grade” is a “benediction” that is
conferred by the CRAs only.464
Keep in mind that Section 11(b)(3)(b) of the Securities Act does
not create strict liability for experts, nor does it create liability for
negligence for experts. To meet their due diligence defense, which is
what auditors and other experts routinely do, CRA experts must merely
prove that “as regards any part of the registration statement purporting
to be made upon his authority as an expert or purporting to be a copy of
or extract from a report or valuation of himself as an expert, (i) he had,
after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did
believe, at the time such part of the registration statement became
effective, that the statements therein were true and that there was no
omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, . . . .”465 In
other words, they must act responsibly, knowing that investors will rely
on their expert opinion. In 1933, the House Report concerning Section
11 of the Securities Act liability “throws upon originators of securities a
duty of competence as well as innocence which the history of recent
a list of restaurants. Once the restaurants have been compiled and a survey is created
for a specific location, the public is [notified] . . . Once the official voting drive is
over reports are created that contain numerical ratings (for Food, Décor, Service and
Cost) of the restaurants on the survey in several categories along with voter comments
. . . Zagat Survey calls every establishment on the survey and fact checks information.
Establishments cannot pay to be included on a survey; likewise Zagat Survey
cannot guarantee that every restaurant on a survey will be included in the guide. All
survey participants are eligible for a reward as a “thank you” for their input. A
complimentary copy of the guide once it is published or a free subscription to
ZAGAT.com is our way of thanking our loyal surveyors.

How the Zagat Survey Works, ZAGAT, http://www.zagatsmartbox.com/how-the-zagatsurvey-works/ (last visited June 14, 2011) (emphasis added).
462. Segal, supra note 4.
463. Watchdogs, supra note 19, at 102.
464. Credit Rating Agencies-NRSROs, SEC (May 12, 2011), available at http://
www.sec.gov/answers/nrsro.htm.
465. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B) (2010) (emphasis added).
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spectacular failures overwhelmingly justifies.”466 “Plus ca change, plus
c’est la meme chose.”467
Items 1103(a)(9) and 1120 of Regulation AB require disclosure of
whether an issuance or sale of any class of offered asset-backed
securities is conditioned on the assignment of a rating by one or more
rating agencies. If so conditioned, those items require disclosure about
the minimum credit rating that must be assigned and the identity of each
rating agency. Item 1120 also requires a description of any arrangements
to have such ratings monitored while the asset-backed securities are
outstanding. With the abolition of Rule 436(g) and the imposition of
Section 11 liability, perhaps the CRAs will do what most people thought
they did—act competently and carefully. The world of asset-backed
securities is complex, indeed too complex for the average investment
advisor or manager to comprehend, never mind the average investor.468
This means that investors are essentially increasingly forced to rely on
CRAs as the information concerning these investments is simply too
difficult to understand.
We believe that the CRAs should have expert liability under
Section 11. This may mean that the markets will essentially flee the
registration route, that is, the public offering route, altogether, as
Section 11 applies only to registered offerings. Ultimately, the CRAs
should be held accountable to market participants who justifiably rely
upon their expertise. One suggestion is that there be created some
formal, periodic assessment of how accurate the CRAs were in their
ratings. In other words, somebody should rate the CRAs themselves,
i.e., rate the raters.

466. LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, 9 SECURITIES REGULATION 4267 (3d ed. 2004)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933)).
467. The more things change the more they are the same.
468. See generally Steven L Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial
Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211 (2009).

